Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2011-11-30-Speech-3-173-000"
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"en.20111130.17.3-173-000"2
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"−
Mr President, the regulation on the Banana Accompanying Measures (BAM) has two sections: a development cooperation section and an institutional section relating to the European Parliament’s power of codecision. The first section does not present any issues. Rather, it is on the institutional aspects that our ideas differ.
How can we make the BAM Regulation compatible with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, and particularly with Article 290? Let it be clear that, under the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament now has the same power as the Council to approve the strategic priorities set in connection with the programming of European funds, including those allocated to development cooperation.
In accordance with the mandate set by Parliament’s Conference of Presidents, and on the basis of the decisions taken by both the Committee on Development and Parliament’s delegation to the Conciliation Committee, I, as rapporteur, adhered to the following two red lines throughout the eight trialogues held with the Council and the Commission.
Firstly, there was no question of relinquishing the equal treatment of Parliament and the Council when financial programming priorities are set. Secondly, and in the same spirit, there was no question of relinquishing the European Parliament’s right of democratic oversight in connection with this instrument and thereby setting an undesirable precedent for the future.
Following eight trialogues, and faced with the inflexibility of the Council, which is not even present here today, two different responses emerged. The majority of the delegation voted in favour of the draft compromise as presented to you. A strong minority, however, failed to endorse the compromise negotiated as part of the conciliation procedure. As rapporteur and as a democrat who respects the principle of the majority, it is my duty to communicate the outcome of our deliberations to you, which is what I have done.
My personal interpretation of parliamentary ethics is such that I could not allow that fact to go unmentioned. Those same ethics permit me, however, to tell you that, personally, I find the outcome extremely unsatisfactory. Why? I find it unsatisfactory because, should the compromise be adopted by Parliament, it could set an undesirable precedent. Indeed, for the BAM project, the European Parliament has only been granted the right to receive information on the strategic choices that the Commission will make in relation to the allocation of the EUR 190 million worth of resources. The European Parliament is given information, and the Council, alone, decides on a Commission proposal.
This is not a step forward; it is two steps back: the first, in relation to the Treaty of Lisbon, and the second, in relation to the situation prior to 1 December 2009, the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, up until 2009, the European Parliament was able to argue its case before the Commission when there was a negative procedure. Such procedures had suspensive effect. Today, they have no such thing. The Council has succeeded in depriving the European Parliament, despite its role as colegislator, of its right of democratic scrutiny by only accepting a solution whereby the Council alone may take strategic decisions within the scope of the Banana Accompanying Measures.
The Council has succeeded in making the implementation of the BAM programme part of a process dictated by Article 291, which relates to implementing measures and nothing else. We are taking two steps backwards here. To tell the truth, we are regressing. That is why I will be unable to vote in favour of this report. That being said, I admit that this is an extremely difficult decision for me, but it is one that I am prepared to take, because I do not want to be involved in setting an undesirable precedent for the forthcoming negotiations on the European Parliament’s powers with regard to the financing of external policy instruments."@en1
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