Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-04-13-Speech-3-257"
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"en.20050413.20.3-257"2
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".
Mr President, I should like to start by considering two different scenarios. When we discussed this issue in committee, Mr Ilves asked what would happen if another terrorist attack on the same scale as the Madrid bombings were to take place in an EU Member State, and if, in the aftermath of such an attack, it were to emerge that the security services in another Member State had been aware that preparations were underway for the attack, but had been unable to inform the authorities in the country in question. In all likelihood, this would trigger a real crisis of legitimacy for the European Union.
A great deal remains to be done, however; for example, we still have no coherent plan of how civilian crisis management forces should be organised. There is a lack of permanent air transport capacity and of permanently available deployable troops, as well as of adequate communications and reconnaissance capacities. The aim of this report is to ensure that the European Parliament – also in view of what Mr Brok said in his introductory speech – can exert an influence on the future development and practical implementation of the European Security Strategy within the framework of dialogue with the Council.
I will now move on to my second example. The European Union has taken command of the NATO-led troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the first time that the European Union has had an opportunity to prove that it is capable of conducting security policy in this area, and to gain practical experience in such matters. I know from talking to my constituents that many people believe that the EU would be delivered from evil, as it were, if it kept its involvement in other people’s business to a minimum.
This kind of attitude can turn out to be fatally flawed, and the European Union does in fact need a security strategy. It is for this reason that the vast majority of committee members welcomed the document which was drafted by Javier Solana during his term in office, and which the committee has continued to work on. We also welcomed the support shown by the governments of the Member States for the document.
There are, however, a number of issues that must be given particular consideration, as they reveal the unique nature of the European Security Strategy. The first of these is the need to understand security problems and their many and diverse possible causes, which include human rights violations, poverty and disease, in a broad context, and not to reduce the Strategy to its military aspects. The Security Strategy is primarily a political concept, and as such transcends military considerations.
The second issue is the need for a commitment to international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
The third issue relates to the need to strengthen international order by means of effective multilateral structures and to safeguard citizens’ fundamental rights within the EU, whilst taking all measures necessary to combat terrorist threats.
In view of these factors, we should not be ashamed to say that the European Union does indeed wish to acquire military decision-making structures and capabilities. The greatest benefit of the Security Strategy is that it enables us to tailor the combination of civilian and military crisis management capabilities to each individual situation.
Opposition to this approach came from two deeply opposed camps within the committee; on the one hand, some members find it impossible to envisage the European Union as anything other than a subsidiary of NATO, whereas on the other hand some members condemn militarisation in the shape of new organisational forms and capacities. Both of these camps represent polar opposites, yet what they have in common is that they use their arguments to oppose and campaign against the European Constitution.
In spite of this opposition, however, a broad consensus was reached within the committee in favour of the Security Strategy, which involves the establishment of various instruments such as a situation centre, a civilian/military planning cell and the setting up of battle groups or the Defence Agency. These are not alternatives to NATO, and indeed most EU Member States are also NATO Member States. Instead, they provide the European Union with new options it has not had in the past. This is the only way it can become an equal partner, for example of countries on the other side of the Atlantic like the United States."@en1
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