Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-09-05-Speech-3-016"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20010905.2.3-016"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spokenAs | |
| lpv:translated text |
"Mr President, the Temporary Committee on ECHELON and other large-scale tapping systems was launched over a year ago. There was then serious doubt as to whether this Committee would be able to complete its mandate that was issued by Parliament within the time period given. My colleague, Mr Gerhard Schmid, presented the report with the results of the work of this temporary committee a moment ago. On behalf of my group, I should like to express my great appreciation for the work that the rapporteur, but also the President of the Committee, Mr Coelho, have done over the past year. The report contains proof for the first time that ECHELON exists, a system based on the cooperation of five countries in the worldwide tapping and interception of international telephone and message traffic. In addition, it is indicated that other countries too, including most EU Member States, use systems for tapping international telecommunications traffic.
At the same time, the report, however, explodes the myth that, via ECHELON and similar systems, every phone call would be tapped and every fax message or e-mail read. It is technically impossible to do this, and most countries involved are democracies which impose clear restrictions on the activities of the secret services, at least with regard to their own citizens. Mainly based on information which was published in the course of the investigation of the ECHELON Committee by the Dutch and German governments, we know that systems for tapping international telecommunication are often used as an aid in the fight against international terrorism, trafficking in human beings, the drugs trade, the illegal arms trade, and to enforce internationally established embargoes. And nobody objects to that, at least, provided that this is done under sound democratic and political control whilst guaranteeing that the international and national rules protecting the privacy of citizens are upheld.
The unnecessary secrecy, the surreptitious behaviour of the secret services and the lack of openness of many governments prevent systems for tapping international telecommunications from being deployed in a more transparent manner. Clear and enforceable rules to protect the privacy of all European citizens in all EU countries must form an inherent part of the constitutional rights as laid down in the European Charter. With this, it must be ensured that the strict rules which currently apply in most countries for tapping a country’s own citizens will, in the near future, apply to all EU citizens.
Effective democratic and political supervision of activities carried out by secret services, and hence tapping international telephone traffic, form an essential part of every state’s right to defend the security of its citizens or its democratic fabric against external attacks.
A change in mentality is required. It is inevitable that some aspects of the work of the intelligence service should remain confidential, but there is also a great deal that could most certainly be brought into the open in a democratic society. Only countries which, in respect of its citizens, deal with their intelligence services in an open and honest way will also be able to provide the necessary cooperation at European level and be able to help set up a European intelligence force in the framework of an effective common foreign and security policy.
With this, the traditional distrust which intelligence services harbour in respect of outsiders and the equally traditional priority given by countries to their own national interests must be turned into a kind of cooperation in which the treaty concluded between the UK and the US, underlying ECHELON, completely fades into the background. Not only because it was agreed during the European Summit in Helsinki that a European intelligence force will be created as part of a European intervention force, but especially because the fight against international terrorism and the trafficking in human beings, for example, is a joint European task.
However, I should like to add one more observation in this connection. Further European cooperation in the gathering of intelligence, which is also significant to the EU in terms of its position within the confederate framework of NATO, will force the British government to make a fundamental choice: either it continues to favour transatlantic cooperation or it becomes fully involved in cooperation at European level. A bit of both would not only lack credibility, but is also practically impossible.
During the investigation by the ECHELON Committee, we have not obtained any evidence that citizens’ privacy is being intentionally violated or that systems designed for large-scale tapping operations involving international telecommunications traffic are deliberately being used for large-scale and direct industrial espionage. Furthermore, specific enquiries made to large European companies elicited no reaction. However, based on remarks made by America, it has transpired that intelligence received accidentally is, in a number of cases, most definitely used. If one casts the herring nets, but happens to catch a salmon, then that salmon is not always thrown back into the sea but sometimes ends up on the table. Whoever has confidential information at their disposal does well to protect that confidential information. In this respect, the European Union and Member States are required to cooperate by giving advice, by developing user-friendly cryptographic hardware and software and especially by raising public awareness.
I hope that the report by the ECHELON Committee in particular has made a major contribution to the aforesaid."@en1
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples