Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-10-03-Speech-2-120"
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"en.20001003.4.2-120"2
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"Mr President, there is no doubt that the EU’s top priority at the dawn of the 21st century is the major historic project of its eastward and partly southward enlargement. This debate aims to underline this. Unmistakably, the personal commitment of the rapporteurs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy and the productive exchange of ideas in those circles, point in the same direction.
The key year for this undreamt-of opportunity of close political cooperation within the Ancient Occident is the 20the century’s miracle year of 1989. As a former journalist, I hold special memories of that year. The words “We are back in Europe” resounded on the streets of East Berlin, Prague and Bucharest. The way in which this almost universal feeling found expression in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 80s still merits our gratitude to this day.
Ten years have now passed since the fall of the wall and the dismantling of the Iron Curtain. The enthusiasm for Europe in the East has made way for fairly harsh criticism. The reason is clear. The road to the European Union, towards accession, is too long for the candidates. Marek Belka, economic advisor to the Polish President expressed this growing impatience and displeasure in very direct terms, when he said that the European Union expects them to implement the necessary reform measures at break-neck speed, yet fails to give them a target date for accession to work towards. His sentiments have been echoed by the President of the Hungarian national bank, who claims that the European Union must give off the right signals. Otherwise, Eastern Europe’s suspicion that Europe does not really take the issue of enlargement seriously might well end in a dangerous disappointment with regard to the Brussels pledges – according to my Hungarian spokesperson.
How can we do away with these Eastern European reservations about the European Union? I propose we do this by adopting a dynamic twin-track policy. The EU should make the necessary institutional preparations at the earliest opportunity in readiness for a good number of new Member States, and present these countries at long last with a realistic accession strategy. As for this strategy, I have in mind a phased enlargement in relatively small rounds of genuinely suitable candidates, spread out over a period of fifteen years or so. In this way, the European Union would run less risk of pre-empting the Copenhagen criteria than would be the case if no fewer than ten candidate countries were to join simultaneously – an idea which has already been floated. Would this automatically remove in one fell swoop the considerable concerns which the EU Member States and the candidate countries have with regard to the enlargement process? Of course not. This is why I particularly like Amendment No 40 tabled by Mrs Malmström to the Brok report. She is asking the European Commission to carry out a major study into the cost of non-enlargement, plus to indicate what the economic gains and losses would be in the long term if enlargement were to be turned down. In addition, Mrs Malmström is urging the European Commission to give the European citizens plenty of information, because they need to be kept informed at all times of the current enlargement process, which has the overarching goal of Europe’s reunification.
Such a vulnerable position, or rather, such political accountability would certainly do Brussels credit. It would also be an example worthy of imitation for the negotiating partners of the European Union in the East. Then the course of enlargement would truly run smooth, with public opinion forming its crucial social basis.
On a final note, Mr President, the gains and losses of the EU’s eastward enlargement should not be deciding factors. If we are going to value the postponed enlargement, the postponed liberation of the other part of our continent properly, and if we wish to draw lessons from both world wars in the previous century, then we will have to roll up our sleeves and start helping, and be prepared to make sacrifices."@en1
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