Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/1999-10-27-Speech-3-172"
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"en.19991027.6.3-172"2
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"The Commission shares the disappointment that has just been expressed by the presidency of the Council that the United States Senate rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The Commission has consistently supported an ambitious European Union policy on non-proliferation issues. Wherever possible, we have complemented CFSP initiatives in this area with action falling within Community competence. Under the Euratom Treaty, for example, we have contributed to the development and strengthening of an efficient nuclear safeguard system in Europe, including the Russian Federation. Activities in this field are supported by financial allocations under the PHARE and TACIS programmes. We are currently considering extending these activities to other areas such as safeguards on chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
The common strategy on Russia also contains specific provisions on non-proliferation. In this context we are examining the scope of cooperation with the United States on the expanded threat reduction initiative.
Accession to the Treaty is also a crucial element in our policy towards South Asia, as the presidency made clear. Following the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan the Commission has participated in the international taskforce set up to develop confidence and security-building measures and to engage these countries in constructive discussions on regional non-proliferation and arms control.
Over the years remarkable progress has been made in international arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, through both bilateral and multilateral efforts. In the multilateral context the ratification of the Treaty and the review of the non-proliferation treaty next year will be crucial to reconfirming earlier commitments and building a platform for further progress.
To achieve this we need to work with the United States and other leading partners. The leading role played by the United States has been essential in developing the global non-proliferation regime. I hope we can encourage our American friends to take up that role again.
We should do everything we can to convince Congress of the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for ourselves, for the United States and for the international non-proliferation efforts. I can assure you that the Commission will continue to bring its contribution to this objective.
I also believe that all honourable Members have a particular role to play in this respect. I would hope that you would use every opportunity to explain and underline to your colleagues in the Senate why they should reconsider their vote on the Treaty and how a renewed commitment to international non-proliferation and arms control will promote American security interests, as well as broader international security and stability.
In that marvellous newspaper the
there is today a shortened version of a speech given the other day to the Council on Foreign Relations by the President’s national security adviser Sandy Berger. American opponents of treaties like the one we are debating today neglected the fact, he pointed out, that the United States has already stopped testing and that the Treaty helped freeze the global development of nuclear weapons when America enjoys an enormous strategic advantage. I hope that, to borrow an unattractively appropriate phrase, the fall-out from this lamentable political decision can be contained. I know that is what the American administration wants. It is what we all want. American senators and congressmen should face up to the responsibilities of their country’s global position. It places a high premium on bi-partisanship in foreign policy in general and in nuclear policy in particular. Failure to recognise that condemns us all to live in a much less safe world.
The Treaty, as honourable Members will know, is the result of decades of hard work, decades of determined work to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, starting with the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the late 1960s. It constitutes a key element in the international strategy to control, reduce and ultimately to eliminate the risk of nuclear conflict. Its ratification by the present nuclear powers is essential for our efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.
The European Union, as the presidency has pointed out, has been and remains fully committed to these objectives. We have worked hard for the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty. All 15 Member States, bar one, have already ratified the Treaty and work is under way in the 15th state to complete the procedures there.
I know that the American administration shares our objectives. President Clinton and his team worked hard to obtain Congressional approval for ratification of the Treaty. They understood, as well as we do, how important it is for us to take the lead together in order to obtain the 44 ratifications which are necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty.
It is therefore all the more regrettable that the Senate voted against ratification. They seem to have done so for internal American reasons as much as on the basis of any assessment of the value of this Treaty for United States’ and international security.
I believe – and this is reflected in the motion put before us today – that they made a very grave mistake. In refusing to give their agreement to the Treaty they offer encouragement to the very states which we wanted to draw into the commitments set out in the Treaty and whose ratification is a condition for its entry into force.
What message has been sent to Russia and China? How will this vote help to persuade countries like India and Pakistan to ratify the Treaty? This regrettable vote may even offer encouragement to other countries in their nuclear aspirations and make them cross the threshold by testing their own nuclear devices.
Any such nuclear tests at this stage might undo all the work which has gone into the Treaty. They would undermine international support and confidence in the multilateral arms control efforts. More seriously, they might trigger reciprocal actions in other countries through testing or through the strengthening of their nuclear programmes.
The Senate refusal to agree to ratify the Treaty is a setback but it is not the end of the road. We must now, more than ever, show our commitment to the Treaty and redouble our efforts to promote its early entry into force. This is essential in order to maintain the international momentum in favour of continued arms limitation and a stronger global non-proliferation regime."@en1
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