Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2012-09-12-Speech-3-376-000"
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"en.20120912.22.3-376-000"2
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"could not have done that to you, as that would have shown a lack of ambition. I really cannot see how we could have gone any further than what you are proposing. I think you have scored 20 out of 20 here. You are trying to supervise all the banks in Europe, and not only some of them. You are aiming for simplicity and I think that we can only welcome this.
Where you have perhaps shown a little less ambition, is when you said, ‘We accepted the legal basis that the Council recommended to us.’ I would nonetheless like to remind you that it is you, and you alone, who have the right of initiative, and therefore you were perfectly at liberty to choose another procedure.
More seriously, obviously I understand the choice of the European Central Bank, but I think that it causes us two problems. It causes us the problem of the concentration of power. I do not think that it is healthy, in a democratic system, for one institution in particular to accumulate too much power. However, here, in the context of crisis management and monetary policy, we are witnessing a kind of mission creep at the Central Bank, a change in its mandate, the temptation, in brief, to extend its powers, and here, we are going to increase them even further. I think that we should pay attention to this matter.
My second point is this: we are dealing with an institution whose traditions do not include democratic accountability, in other words one in which independence is a deeply rooted family tradition. I find it hard to see how those very people who pride themselves on their total independence when they come before us as a monetary authority can then show the requisite deference to the democratic institutions when they act as supervisors. I think that we would need a great deal of imagination to introduce provisions and rules to ensure that there are no abuses of power or lack of democratic accountability.
In any case, it is clear that, by subjecting all European banks to European supervision, you are breaking not only the unhealthy link between public debt and private debts, but you are also perhaps breaking another link, that is the rather excessive complicity between the supervised and the supervisors at national level. That incestuous behaviour should cease and you will contribute to that."@en1
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