Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2012-04-19-Speech-4-460-000"
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"en.20120419.19.4-460-000"2
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"Madam President, our group supported the call at the time of the last amendment to the Biometric Passports Regulation in 2009 for a review to be carried out in three years’ time and for four studies to be presented. One of the reasons that our group supported this was because it has expressed major concerns time and again on the grounds of data protection and also on account of the overestimation of the benefit of using biometric data in passports.
The belief in the perfect form of identification, the overestimation of this method too, and – associated with this – the overestimation of other parts of the security chain are genuinely problematic. The use of biometric data is still subject to this major misconception, namely the assumption that these data are unchangeable and mostly reliable. That is absolutely not the case. These data are also subject to change throughout a person’s life. They differ between childhood and old age. We therefore need reliable and sound studies and conclusions.
People are still busily forging these documents. We have now been able to establish this. As the incidents in the United Kingdom and other countries repeatedly demonstrate, the chips are definitely not safe from misuse. They are readily cracked and, for those concerned, this can result in permanent damage. The standards within the EU also differ widely. The error rate – as seen in France and the Netherlands – is very high. We need to ask ourselves again and again what benefit we get from biometric data if documents are falsified and enter into circulation. Thus, if one part of the chain is falsified and the ‘breeder’ documents are at variance, biometric data would no longer be of any help to us.
The Chaos Computer Club in Germany needed a few minutes only to demonstrate the falsification of a chip. For this, the people of the Chaos Computer Club needed the cap of a plastic bottle, some superglue, a digital camera and a little wood glue, and in a few minutes they had cracked the chip. So much for supposed security. We are waiting for the Commission to present the studies and, of course, also the results and the lessons that can be drawn from them."@en1
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