Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2011-09-29-Speech-4-083-000"
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"en.20110929.5.4-083-000"2
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"Madam President, honourable Members, ten years after the events of 9/11, the risk of terrorist attacks remains real and aviation is still a preferred target. Airport security scanners are a valid alternative to existing screening methods because they have good detection performance, in particular to deal with the major risk from non-metallic threat items.
Moreover, in a field like aviation security, decisions need to be taken quickly to respond to a security threat. This is in the passengers’ interest. The ordinary legislative procedure would not be appropriate to achieve this objective. The result would be that Member States would take national measures. The role of the European Union in aviation security, and the ability to set common EU standards, would be diminished.
It is important now to move forward on this file. Parliament, passengers, Member States and the aviation industry have been waiting for a clear position for a long time. A common EU approach to the use of this equipment is the only way to ensure both the highest level of aviation security and the best possible protection of EU citizens’ fundamental rights and health. Common EU rules also overcome the existing fragmented situation.
The Commission’s draft measure does not impose the deployment of security scanners at EU airports, but allows Member States and airports wishing to do so to deploy security scanners at EU airports under strict minimum EU operational safeguards and detection performance conditions. It only allows the use of non X-ray security scanners. Failure to adopt the rules at European level will mean unilateral actions, and very possibly the US standards being imposed.
Where privacy and data protection are concerned, the use of security scanners raises important issues of privacy and data protection. The Commission fully agrees with Parliament’s objectives in this regard. Our draft measure imposes strict conditions for the use of scanners. These conditions are in line with the advice given by the Fundamental Rights Agency and the European Data Protection Supervisor, and provide all the necessary safeguards for the protection of fundamental rights, privacy and data protection. Passengers must be fully informed about the technology and of the conditions of the security scanning.
Hand searches, which are performed today to detect threat items, are perceived by many to be quite intrusive. The Commission’s draft measure aims to offer passengers and staff an alternative, by going through a security scanner. Two types of scanners currently exist. Both systems ensure compliance with security standards and respect fundamental rights. For example, security scanners shall not store, retain, copy, print or retrieve images.
One type of scanner, which is currently more common, makes use of a human reviewer to determine where possible threat items are to be found. To protect personal data in the use of such scanners, our proposal stipulates that no image can be seen at the security screening point, but is instead remotely analysed by a security officer located elsewhere. In addition, the image cannot be linked to the screened person and must be blurred or obscured to prevent the identification of the face of the passenger. The human reviewers analysing the image cannot see the screened passenger, nor do they have any access to personal data identifying the person. These safeguards address fundamental rights concerns by protecting the person’s dignity and privacy, and guarantee the protection of personal data. Moreover, these are minimum conditions and Member States can impose stricter ones.
The second type of scanner is able to recognise threats automatically. These machines do not produce a real image, but a stick figure which is marked with possible threat items. The Commission shares the view that automated threat detection is the preferred method. It is therefore committed to working closely with the industry and Member States to make sure that, as soon as possible, only such scanners are used. However, if today’s scanners were limited to models using stick figures, the market would be severely restricted, giving undue advantage to a few manufacturers.
Finally, regardless of the type of scanner used, the draft measure gives passengers the possibility to choose not to go through a scanner. No passenger will be forced to use the scanner, as Parliament requested.
Regarding the procedure, while we understand your interest, the Commission does not believe that this draft measure should be adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure. Amendments to the methods of screening fall within the scope of the comitology procedure as established in the existing framework regulation on aviation security.
Let me recall that before presenting this draft, an open and transparent consultation process with all parties involved was conducted, including a public consultation and an impact assessment. The Commission exchanged views regularly with Parliament. We waited for Parliament’s resolution on aviation security of last July before finalising this draft. The current draft measures reflect Parliament’s opinion to the greatest extent possible."@en1
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