Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2011-09-28-Speech-3-015-000"
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"Mr President, first of all I would like to thank the President of the Commission for his speech on the state of the Union and also for a number of his proposals.
Secondly, I missed one important element in your proposals. There is a European plan to recapitalise the European banks. The problem of the European banks has not been solved, and we shall not recover from this recession or the stagnation or economic downturn if we do not first of all recreate trust between the banks and recapitalise them. Only a European solution can solve this. I know that Mrs Merkel refused that proposal on 4 October 2008. She heard on the radio that there were some problems with a German bank. So you see what history can signify: if she had heard that news maybe three hours before, she would have accepted the solution of a European rescue plan for banks.
But let us come back to this. Mr Barroso, my request to you is that you put all this in a document on the table of the Council in two weeks’ time. We cannot do it as a European Parliament. The European Council cannot do it. You have the power, you have the right of initiative, and I can tell you that this whole Parliament will be behind you if you take such an action.
Let us be very blunt about this. As you have recognised, the state of the Union is bad. Let us also repeat here in this House that this crisis is not about Greece and Greece’s debt. This is a crisis about the euro, about the European Union and, in fact, a crisis today about the existence – the vital existence – of the European Union. We are confronted today
yes, the only difference is that you gave bad answers to that question, that is the problem – because the real questions we have to ask are: are we able to stand together in this crisis? Are we able to stand united in this crisis? Are we able to show real solidarity in this crisis, and have we the vision to do so, the courage to do so and the political leadership in the European Union to do so? These are the questions that we need to face today.
Let us start with the state of the Union. The state of the Union is bad, but I think we have to face today’s reality. We are in the middle – not at the end – of a crisis, really in the centre of it. Look at the reality. Mistrust of banks has again risen over recent days and weeks. Markets and stocks are at the lowest level since 2008. The International Monetary Fund yesterday lowered its growth forecast for Europe for next year to only 1.1%, down from 1.6%. Some economists are already talking about recession in the Union. Finally – this is important because we will come back to this later on – spreads: the tensions inside our markets have never been so high. Before the financial crisis, the spreads in the eurozone – that is the difference between the average of the obligations, the bonds of other countries (and Germany) – were only 19 – less than 20 – basic points. Today the spreads are ten times higher. The average of the bonds in the eurozone – NT bonds – is more than 200 basic points, with, naturally, Greece at 2 149 basic points of difference – a 21%-higher interest rate. In Portugal there is a difference of more than 1 000, as there is in Spain. In Italy there is a difference of 400 basic points. These are tensions that are not sustainable. This must be solved not yesterday, not today but in a short time period because it is unsustainable to continue like this.
There is a second question that we have to answer today. What solutions were provided for this crisis – mainly by the Council, as has been indicated, and mainly by the Member States? They were half measures, measures that have been seen as too little, too late. You will remember that the first Council initiative after the start of the crisis in December 2009 was to announce a European solution to the crisis by launching EUR 30 billion of bilateral loans to solve the crisis. That was the big idea in February 2010 of the Member States and the Council. No European answers, no: bilateral loans to a single country in the south of Europe. That should create the solution. What we saw was the crisis becoming more and more difficult to overcome.
I should say that the highlight of this bad approach to the crisis has been the casino deal of the real world. The decision was taken between France and Germany not to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact but to weaken the Commission’s proposal on the Stability and Growth Pact. We were in the middle of the crisis on the Stability and Growth Pact and then the Member States came forward with a proposal, saying that they had a deal in Deauville, near the casino – which is not such a bad one, everybody wins there – and in the end the outcome was that we lowered the sanctions, we lowered the penalties and you could simply continue the game inside the Stability and Growth Pact. This has ruined the Stability and Growth Pact.
So, Mr Barroso, the most important conclusion of today has to be the message that you gave. You gave it here, very well and to much applause, but now you have to repeat it in another place, somewhere in Brussels, at the Council. I am no longer there, but I am sure we will know what you say there. You will have to repeat it there, telling them that the intergovernmental method is a bad method that cannot work. And why can it not work? Because it needs unanimity; the Polish know about that, as Poland disappeared in the 18th century because of the unanimity rule in the Polish Parliament: that is history and reality. The same could happen in Europe if we continue with this unanimity rule. We have to abolish it. Colleagues, this is the real problem. Why is there such a problem in this crisis? Because the Member States are reluctant to transfer new sovereignty and powers to the European Union. We all know that the only way out of this crisis is a new transfer of powers to the European Union and to the European institutions. That is at stake.
Mr Barroso, I am pleased with a number of the initiatives that you have announced today. They are key to my group. You have said that we shall take an initiative in the coming weeks on eurobonds. You have already found a new name: stability bonds. No problem. You can call them what you like – eurobonds, stability bonds – if they are bonds to mutualise debts and, as you have indicated, to make and create more discipline – not only solidarity – in the Union. Very well, we look forward to this in the coming weeks. You have said that we shall put proposals on the table to organise economic governance beyond the six pack. I think this is necessary and is a first step to real economic and fiscal union. You have also said that you should reflect on the external single representation of the eurozone at international level.
However, what I am asking is that you go further than this and that in the coming two weeks, at the European Council on 17 October, you put a global plan on the table of the Council. Why do you have to do that? Because otherwise they take their own initiatives in the Council. You have the right of initiative; they do not. If you do not use your right of initiative by putting a document on the table with these different initiatives in it, others will fill the vacuum.
This should be done on three specific topics. First of all, the organisation of the real economic government inside the Commission. You have said here that we are the real economic government, but the reality is different. Mr Juncker, Mr Van Rompuy, Mr Rehn, Mr Barroso, the President of the European Central Bank, we have at least five people who represent Europe. We need one, and it can only be a senior Commissioner that you have to appoint. Make him European Minister of Finance and then all this discussion of who is representing the euro would be over."@en1
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