Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2010-11-24-Speech-3-524"

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"Mr President, I am happy that the European Parliament shares our view that the defence of EU production against international trade distortions should be considered as a necessary component of an open and fair trade strategy. As regards SMEs, trade defence instruments indeed represent a challenge for SMEs, in terms of both costs and complexity. There is a need to reduce the administrative burden for SMEs in trade defence investigations. This is why I have commissioned a study to look at the specific difficulties that SMEs face when dealing with TDIs, and at possible solutions to alleviate these difficulties. Regarding the institutional aspects, you will have noted that the comitology proposal submitted by the Commission in March provides for Parliament to be fully informed as to the committee proceedings. The Commission will also provide information on the proposed measures on which the committees are asked to deliver an opinion, the final measures and the final adoption by the Commission. At any time, Parliament can obtain further information on request. In this context, let me confirm that the Commission is effectively ready to make a proposal on the alignment of the trade defence instruments with the new system of control of delegated and implementing acts (this is the so-called ‘trade omnibus’). However, as you are aware, there is significant discussion between the institutions on the overall issue of implementing acts. The Commission is carefully following the discussion and gauging, on the basis of contacts with the other institutions, when such a proposal should be adopted by the Commission. However, let me be clear that the only issue is that of when the proposal will be made, not whether it will be made. There was also the specific question by Mr Moreira on the comitology. There, I would like to be very clear. I see no argument whatsoever in the Treaty of Lisbon for having special treatment for comitology when it concerns trade, and we will not agree to that. Of course, the decision is in the hands of Parliament and the Council, although the Commission could also have a role to play, as, ultimately, could the European Court of Justice. Introducing a different majority – because that is what it really comes down to – for overruling the Commission on questions of trade is not acceptable to us, and it is certainly not acceptable to me. Finally, regarding the use of trade defence instruments by third countries, we have indeed observed an increase since the beginning of the economic crisis. I would like to assure you that we follow trade defence actions by third countries closely, and we take action when necessary – including intense monitoring, effective support for EU exporters affected and, indeed, the initiation of dispute-settlement procedures at the WTO. In many cases the Commission’s actions lead to the termination of the investigation without the imposition of measures. In other cases, these interventions often result in lesser measures being imposed on the EU exporters concerned. There was also a question about possible forms of retaliation towards third countries in respect of pressures exerted on European companies. We have received petitions on this matter from European companies but we do not disclose their names, in order to protect them. For example, in a recent case involving China, China attacked the dispute settlement in the WTO and the panel supported us, but we have not made public the names of the companies concerned, and I think this was also to protect the companies. Two final questions were on whether we are going to review the trade defence instruments. We are not, because I truly believe it is not necessary. There is an enormous amount of work to be done on trade in the coming years, and I must say that I do not want to reopen certain discussions through such a review process. I would consider doing so only once the Doha Round is over. There was also a specific question by the Green member. Mr Schlyter, your question is an interesting one, I must say, because, as you most probably know, these anti-dumping cases are introduced by companies. They are taken on the basis of a complaint by a company. So if a company were to raise the issue that you put forward concerning carbon leakage, then the Commission would, of course, investigate and see whether the case ought to result in measures being imposed. But the issue is certainly not beyond the scope of the arguments that we consider. We consider the arguments that are put forward by the companies concerned, so if a company were to put this before us then we would certainly look into the matter. I share your view that trade defence instrument (TDI) decisions must continue to be founded on technical and factual elements, and I am confident we have one of the most effective and fairest trade defence systems in the world. I am aware that, in anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, there are many interests at stake and that some stakeholders attempt to influence the decision. Nevertheless, I can confirm that the decision-making process is effective, transparent and based on factual evidence and thorough analysis. I acknowledge that third parties have recently tried to influence our decision making by pressuring industries or, indeed, Member States and companies operating in these third countries. I strongly condemn such actions. In this context, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon provides an opportunity to address this problem. I would like to assure you that the number of TDI cases remains stable over the medium and long term: so, in response to Mr Sturdy, no, it is not going up. We have managed to avoid any significant increase which could have happened as a result of the world recession, and have ensured that the anti-dumping instrument would not be used for protectionist purposes. Most statistics show that the number of cases in the EU remains lower than in our main trading partners. China remains, by and large, the main source of unfair trade (around 35% of cases launched by the EU are against China). I am determined to take action where necessary, and this includes anti-subsidy action. Mr Sturdy also put a question with respect to a recent case, the so-called ‘modem case’, where the Commission had, in fact, looked at three aspects: the dumping, the subsidisation and also the safeguards. The dumping and the subsidisation were investigated on the basis of complaints by the company concerned and, according to the basic regulations, complainants can withdraw their complaints. EU law stipulates that, where a case is withdrawn, the proceedings can be terminated unless such termination would not be in the Community interests. We are currently examining the implications of the withdrawals. It should be pointed out that the Commission has accepted such withdrawals in the past and has consequently terminated investigations without taking measures. On the third case, concerning the safeguards, this is, in fact, a complaint initiated by the government concerned in the case – the Belgian Government – so that is a somewhat different procedure. The company concerned (Option NV) has now informed the Commission that it has asked the Belgian Government to withdraw the request for the imposition of safeguard measures, but the Belgian Government has not yet informed the Commission whether it will comply with Option’s request, so we are waiting for the Belgian Government to take a decision on its position. That is precisely what has happened in this case. Now, continuing on the broader issues, trade defence instruments are there for good reasons. In the absence of international competition rules and other rules associated with properly functioning markets, trade defence instruments are the only possible means of protecting our industry against unfairly traded goods. We seek to use these rules in the most efficient way for our industries. The existence of time limits ensures quick action for the industry and predictability for exporters. I intend to keep our instruments effective and fair, for the benefit of all the economic operators concerned. The international rules on trade defence are being renegotiated in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU position there is clear: we want to maintain the effectiveness of our instruments while protecting our business against protectionist actions by others. These WTO negotiations, as well as changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon, are important in relation to any review of our rules that we would wish to undertake."@en1
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