Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2010-09-21-Speech-2-604"
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"en.20100921.21.2-604"2
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"Madam President, the Council has already taken flight – possibly because of the fierce criticism it met with on the previous item, although the content of the Surján report has done something to repair what was decided by the European Council during this difficult, long night on the stabilisation package. Now the Commissioner has spoken of the unlikely event of these guarantees being used in respect of the European budget. If we are optimists, then we will accept this basic assumption for the time being.
Nonetheless, we must bear in mind that where guarantees are concerned, we already have three unlikely cases in the European budget: a loan fund for the investment bank with guarantees of just over EUR 100 million. Before the euro was launched, we had a situation in which all the Member States were able to obtain assistance with supporting their balance of payments, at that time with a ceiling of EUR 16 billion. Following the introduction of the euro, this arrangement was restricted to non-euro countries, and in the wake of the 2009 financial crisis, the ceiling for non-euro Member States was expanded to EUR 50 billion, of which around EUR 9-10 billion is currently utilised as guarantees.
Now, with the Treaty of Lisbon, we have the situation that Article 143 explicitly refers to the non-euro countries. Undoubtedly, Article 352 would have been the most appropriate legal basis, but that would have meant getting Parliament involved – as well as some national parliaments – and therefore it was probably difficult to make recourse to it in the difficult circumstances of this decision. In this respect, then, Article 122 was certainly not the most correct legal basis, but it was the most politically expedient legal basis and the simplest without involving Parliament.
Clearly, there was a gap in our regulations here, but this did not result in the European Union being unable to act in a time of crisis. I can accept that. Nonetheless, the decision by the European Council on this tricky legal basis means making recourse – if necessary – to the margin between the limit of the Union’s own resources and the maximum level of the multiannual financial framework.
Article 310 of the treaty clearly states that no legislative acts shall be adopted that exceed the limit of the Union’s own resources or the multiannual financial framework. If need be, then, a revision is required. In this respect, the Council itself took a huge step without involving the budgetary authority as regards the future debate on the issue ‘What is the upper limit of a financial perspective?’. So let me say that the future upper limit of the multiannual financial framework will be the limit of the Union’s own resources, and nothing else.
We should approve the report on the grounds of political judiciousness, but we should encourage and fight to ensure that in future, we debate properly with each other the gaps in regulation that clearly exist as well as how to involve Parliament and how to close these gaps. This, too, should form part of the common interinstitutional agreement on the budget based on the Treaty of Lisbon."@en1
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