Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2010-09-06-Speech-1-311"
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"en.20100906.22.1-311"2
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"Madam President, the Brussels 1 Regulation describes specific provisions regulating court jurisdiction in civil and business matters and the recognition and enforcement of judgments by other Member States. It has been hailed, rightly, as a great success. It has facilitated the free movement of judgments; it has increased legal certainty and has made it possible to avoid simultaneous proceedings, although in certain circles, it has been criticised for being impracticable or anti-business. The judgments of the Court of Justice are also seen as inconsistent. Whilst the Brussels I Regulation was being approved, only one consultation took place in Parliament. Now Parliament will be busy with all future proposals concerning amendments to the regulation, according to normal legislative procedure, so it is a good thing that we are already working on the Commission’s Green Paper. Matters raised in the Green Paper include the possible abolition of the exequatur procedure, the functioning of the regulation in the wider international order, the functioning of the clauses relating to selection of courts, the functioning of the regulation in cases involving industrial and intellectual property and the possible reform of the lispendens procedure. I have tried to write a measured, future-facing report. I was touched by the reaction to two working documents in which I supported the concept of abolition of the exequatur procedure, which should bring concrete benefits to the citizens of the European Union. At the same time, I remain convinced that this step must be compensated for with a special procedure linked to appropriate safeguards for debtors. Independently of abolishing the exequatur procedure, I am convinced that government acts should not be implemented directly in the originating state without being inspected by the appropriate legal authorities of that state; and, furthermore, the principle that the enforcement clause may be rejected or amended only in cases where the ruling is not consistent with the public policy of the state which granted the enforcement clause should be changed. In certain circumstances, the government act may not conform to previous court rulings in the originating state.
I continue to be opposed to the abolition of arbitration within the scope of the regulation. However, I do believe that we should thoroughly rethink the connection between arbitration and court proceedings and that until we carry out a full review and wide-ranging consultations, we should not seek to realise a concept of basic protection of arbitral jurisdiction. In the future, I find the concept of granting full feedback on provisions of the regulation very attractive. It is currently too early for this, however. I urge wide-ranging consultation and political debate before any action is taken in this matter which goes beyond the suggestions presented in the draft report. I also support the idea of renewing negotiations on conventions relating to international judgments at the forum of the Hague conference. The report does touch on some very complex problems in the field of private international law. In spite of the fact that the question of libel has not been addressed in the Commission’s Green Paper, the problem of forum shopping, choosing the most beneficial jurisdiction in order to obtain the greatest amount of damages in libel cases, certainly does exist. The freedom of the word and the media must remain in balance with the rights of the individual who has been libelled, or whose right to privacy has been breached. As a result, I am against the exclusion of the question of libel from the general principles of the Brussels 1 Regulation. Of course, I am considering whether an instrument such as Brussels 1 is an appropriate instrument for regulating the principles of private international law. Maybe another legal instrument is necessary to regulate the conflict between the freedom of the media and basic individual rights. The Brussels 1 Regulation has not been brought into being to assess the quality of court judgments in Member States. The European Court of Justice, in its Lugano opinion, clearly stated that the Brussels 1 legal instrument was based on mutual trust.
I would like to thank my colleagues from the Committee on Legal Affairs, in particular, Mrs Diana Wallis and Mrs Evelyn Regner."@en1
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