Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2010-06-15-Speech-2-655"
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"en.20100615.34.2-655"2
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"Mr President, Schengen was a trade-off for the freedom of movement of people and goods and trusting those members involved to carry out appropriate measures to ensure safety and security on their own turf. Although the UK is not part of the formal Schengen acquis, we use aspects of the Schengen Information System in fighting crime. Yet, at the same time, the system and the Schengen acquis in general also provide the more astute criminal with a broader platform for international crime and corruption.
After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the SIS, the primary question must be whether these Member States are at a point where they can guarantee a level of scrutiny domestically to warrant free movement across the continent. There has been significant opposition to moving towards a second evolution of the Schengen Information System, in particular, the equilibrium between cost and efficiency. The UK operates independent stringent checks and does not participate in passport-free travel. Will we have to provide financial support for developing information gathering systems in those countries aspiring to Schengen, in order to mitigate the potential increase in crime related to open-border policy?
Schengen brought with it an increase in the possibility of trafficking in illegal goods and people across borders. The security of travel without border controls rests heavily upon trust in the ability of individual Member States to perform checks to appropriate standards.
The expansion of the Schengen Information System increases the window for corruption and creates a much larger collection of information for criminals wishing to hack into the network. Similarly, deeper integration alongside a broadening of Member State involvement may require an expansion of measures used in the Schengen Information System, especially as we approach the advent of SIS II. For example, at what point will the storage of biometric data be positive?
Critics also worry that the system may be used to monitor citizens with particular political views, with information garnered liable to be mishandled for political ends. With an increasing number of states joining the acquis, the risk is heightened. About 500 000 computers are currently able to access the Schengen Information System. It cannot be known how many of these systems are free of malicious software. In general, one in two computers have been victims to malicious infection. Spyware allows a third party to access the same data as the user. The broader the system, the more data there is to access, and the greater the number of criminals with aspirations to abuse the system.
Member States must demonstrate exceptionally advanced security and, even with the greatest efforts and intentions, one cannot rule out the possibility of a breach which, in turn, would compromise all involved."@en1
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