Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2010-02-10-Speech-3-511"
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"en.20100210.29.3-511"2
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"Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin this debate by thanking Parliament for the opportunity to hold a calm debate on counter-terrorism policy, and on certain elements of counter-terrorism policy in particular. I also applaud the timing of this debate, as a reasonable amount of time has elapsed since the worldwide commotion caused by the failed attack in Detroit in December of last year.
The fourth conclusion I have drawn is that the events in Detroit should remind us how important it is to work on reversing the process of radicalisation. In my opinion, the personality of suspected terrorists is a very significant factor in relation to this issue.
Lastly, Detroit calls for us to pay close attention to failed states, or to any states that are in danger of becoming failed states due to their circumstances.
The first and second conclusions concern the ongoing threat to civil aviation and the need to integrate all of the data available to us; they lead us directly to this afternoon’s debate or debates, regarding data and its use, and body scanners.
I should say that this is not a new debate, nor is it the first time we have debated it in this House. Mr de Kerchove, the Counter-terrorism Coordinator, talked about information management and personal data protection in his interesting and lucid report during a debate on the subject in this House on 26 November. Data and analysis of data are a key element in the struggle to prevent and deal with terrorism, which is the subject of this afternoon’s debate.
We need to identify terrorists; we need to know where they are planning to attack, who is providing them with weapons; we need to know the material infrastructure supporting them; we need to know their communication systems; and we can find this out by means of databases and specialised sources. We need data exchange so that we can obtain all the available information, and we must manage it properly.
I hasten to add that some of the attacks that we have suffered in the past could have been avoided if the information had been made available in good time to those responsible for counter-terrorist measures; in other words, if the information had been handled in an integrated, and if you will pardon the expression, an intelligent manner, which does not always happen. This brings us to the debate on information management.
We have the framework of the EU within which we can exchange information appropriately. Our recently adopted strategy formed part of the Council’s conclusions last November. It aims to provide the security forces and intelligence services with the necessary data, in the interests of improving the usefulness and effectiveness of the counter-terrorist strategy. The necessary data and only that, nothing more, since bulk data sometimes has a negative effect on its own value and effectiveness.
As this strategy indicates, the decisions regarding data exchange should be of a coherent, professional, efficient, viable, reliable nature, and understandable for all the citizens and all the professionals who work with it. According to its guidelines, the strategy must bear in mind the statements and concerns that we have dealt with in this House; the need to fight against terrorism, as well as the issues of human rights, the right to privacy, and to protection of personal data.
As I said at the beginning of the debate, another of the consequences that we can draw from the alleged Detroit attack is that commercial aircraft continue to be a fundamental target for terrorists. Obviously, the alleged terrorist succeeded in boarding the aircraft with a sufficient quantity of explosives to cause it to explode in the air, thus thwarting all of our surveillance systems and all of our airport security systems and mechanisms. In other words, we obviously need to review these security mechanisms, because they were clearly insufficient for preventing an attack such as the alleged Detroit attack, which fortunately did not take place.
To summarise, we must keep on improving our security services, to try to avoid terrorists or suspected terrorists boarding commercial flights. We have to prevent anyone being able to board a plane with weapons, explosives or chemical precursors of explosives. In case these two safety measures fail us, we need to do more to protect our planes and avoid in-flight incidents.
Of course, when something like this happens, when it comes to tackling a threat such as the threat of terrorism, I believe in making a response, but I am much more in favour of working quietly and continuously, slowly but surely, as we say in my country. I would emphasise to the House that the threat of terrorism is still as real as it was in all of the EU countries.
This is precisely the framework for the debate that we are having on an issue of concern within this House and the Council, the issue of body scanners.
As the honourable Members know, in matters of air safety, the Commission holds the relevant jurisdiction to set targets and make regulations. These matters are debated in the formal and informal Council of Transport Ministers. However, I would like to mention that this matter of air security was the subject of a debate in the informal Council of Ministers, which took place a few weeks ago in Toledo.
We agreed on various matters in this Council: firstly, that it is correct and appropriate for the EU to hold a common position on body scanners and, more generally, on all of the protection mechanisms in our airports; it does not make sense that some airports are less protected than others, because it essentially means that we are all less protected. As such, we would be pleased if the European Union could reach an agreement, and hold a common position in this debate.
Secondly, on a more difficult, delicate matter, where there are different aspects to consider: firstly and obviously, to find out how efficient this type of body scanner is in preventing terrorists from boarding planes with explosives, or chemical precursors to explosives. Secondly, we need to find out and analyse if these scanners are compatible with people’s right to privacy and intimacy, which is of concern to the Council, the Commission, and to this House. The third matter we agreed on is to find out if there could be any health risks for those who pass through this machine to board commercial flights.
With regard to these three issues: the Commission is working on three studies regarding the efficiency of body scanners, their effect on health, and on their compatibility with people’s human rights and fundamental freedoms. These studies will be available to the Council and this House in the near future.
For this reason, the informal Council in Toledo agreed to research and provide this information, so that we can have a thorough debate, and hopefully reach a unanimous position on this matter, which would be very desirable.
Once we have achieved this common position, we will take fully into account the Resolution that this Parliament passed on 23 October 2008, after a debate on body scanners. During the debate, we discussed the need for an evaluation of the impact on human rights, the health risks and the economic impact, as well as the need for consultation with the European Data Protection Supervisor. These considerations must be taken into account in our next debate.
I would like to reiterate my thanks to this House for the opportunity to debate these issues, and my thanks to Parliament for its flexibility regarding the timing of the debate.
We know that the terrorists observe us, we know that they are innovative and try to change their methods to evade our strategies in the fight against terrorism. Our strategy also needs to be innovative and varied because of this; it needs to improve and, most importantly, we must learn from our mistakes, since we certainly do make mistakes.
This being said, we are all aware that if there had not been a failed attack in Detroit in December, we would probably not be debating this issue in the terms that we are in this House. In other words, this debate is born from the need for precautions, and especially for conclusions, which we have all drawn from examining the success in Detroit that I just mentioned.
At the core of today’s debate is also an analysis of where we failed in dealing with the alleged attack, and the measures that different countries are adopting to prevent those mistakes from being made again. Therefore, we are talking about analysing data, about counter-terrorism services; we are talking about exchanging data, and we are talking about body scanners. We are talking about mistakes made in an attack that fortunately did not happen.
Given that this is the subject of our debate, I would like to mention some of the most obvious conclusions that I think we can draw from the failed attack on Detroit. There are five conclusions.
Firstly, Detroit highlights the fact that terrorists continue to target civil aviation as a priority.
Secondly, Detroit highlights the importance of collecting data, but also of integrating and analysing it.
Thirdly, Detroit highlights that the associates of al-Qaeda are in a position to launch attacks outside of what we would call their own territory. This applies to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (the terrorist organisation suspected of being behind the failed attack in Detroit) or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb countries, who represent a threat to us all."@en1
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