Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2008-11-20-Speech-4-052"
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"en.20081120.4.4-052"2
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"Mr President, I wish to begin by thanking Ms Gräßle for her energetic drive in this matter and the Committee on Budgetary Control for forcefully carrying through the debate. The Commission appreciates the considerable work of the rapporteur, who was instrumental in taking up this proposal, pending since 2006. A first proposal had already been made in 2004.
The Commission also made clear that it cannot accept a limited number of proposals which, in their current wording, would depart from the governance improvements envisaged or would remove safeguards contained in the current Regulation.
This covers, for example, the scope of the governance framework, the procedural rights of persons concerned or a more effective follow-up of minor cases.
However, the Commission took careful note that, in parallel to the discussion of the current reform proposal, both the European Parliament and the Council repeatedly, and in a particularly insistent manner, stressed their preference for further simplification and consolidation of the entire complex of anti-fraud legislation. The upcoming Czech presidency asked the Commission to present a concept paper on that in time for a working-level discussion scheduled during the latter part of its mandate.
The Commission is therefore striving to present the requested broad reflection paper in early 2009, based on past experience with the existing anti-fraud set-up and the input from the current reform discussion, as well as any other useful elements, as sketched out above. The European Parliament will be fully involved in that.
Let me conclude by stressing again that the Commission is thankful for the support from the European Parliament. The Commission is not shying away from openly saying where, in our view, the limits are, but the Commission has been, and will remain, ready to discuss in a spirit of full transparency and cooperation all issues necessary to designing a strong and credible framework for the future of OLAF and a successful fight against fraud.
Times have changed since 2004 and 2006. The largest part of OLAF’s work now is not with the institutions but with external parties, conducting anti-fraud investigations throughout Europe and indeed throughout the world, wherever EU funds are spent. It has great success in this work, as is widely recognised.
What remains is a schizophrenic situation, if you allow that analytical term: on the one hand OLAF is a ‘normal’ Commission directorate general, for which the Commission has full responsibility; on the other hand, it is an investigative function, fully independent in its operations, but for which the Commission is also held responsible. Where are the limitations, and where are the limits of independence and accountability in such a set-up?
It is our view that with the necessary independence from outside interference of a credible anti-fraud service comes the need for a clear and strong governance set-up. Clear rules for investigations and strong accountability arrangements are the mirror of operational independence.
There are basically only two options: OLAF as part of the Commission, but with clear allocation and separation of responsibility, or make OLAF entirely independent from any EU institution and ensure separate strong oversight and accountability.
The guiding principles behind the Commission’s 2006 proposal were to strengthen the existing OLAF legal framework: a clearer governance set-up for OLAF; reinforced accountability and oversight; reinforced protection of persons under investigation and a reinforced framework for investigations and their follow-up.
On that basis, the Commission can fully support the amendments proposed in the draft report you are voting on today that are in line with the broad objectives of reform, and can thank you for those developed further.
On the other hand, the Commission made it very clear throughout the drafting process that some amendments cannot be taken into account in the current situation, simply because OLAF’s present status as a Commission directorate-general does not legally permit such changes.
This includes, for example: OLAF concluding independent cooperation agreements; OLAF’s independent appearance before the European Court of Justice; or the European Parliament and the Council deciding on OLAF directorate-general appointments."@en1
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