Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2008-10-20-Speech-1-124"
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"en.20081020.15.1-124"2
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Mr President, honourable Members, we have heard a lively speech for the prosecution. I do not know if I shall reply to all these questions, but I shall begin by thanking you, Mrs in’t Veld, for the opportunity you have given us first of all of discussing the PNR agreement concluded between Australia and the European Union on 30 June.
Certain Member States – France, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium – have embarked upon legislative processes towards the same end or are considering the possibility of commencing a legislative process. Several other countries have begun to consider the idea of using PNR data. However, we are in the initial stages only.
We should take account of the fact that PNR data are simply a tool that can be used by the law enforcement authorities along with other tools and information, because the question you have raised, to find out what the usefulness of such a use really is, cannot be appreciated except in a context in which police authorities use PNR data in conjunction with other instruments.
Clearly, it is much more difficult to grasp exactly what the usefulness of PNR data is. Nevertheless, it appears to be the case that, in certain countries that have used PNR data, they have genuinely proved to be a useful weapon in the fight against terrorism and crime. PNR systems have been evaluated by the authorities in each country. The results of these evaluations are on the whole positive and confirm that recourse to PNR systems has been effective.
While preparing its proposal for European PNR, the Commission was in close contact with Member State police authorities. The Commission was clearly quite satisfied by the evidence offered by the Member States. The majority of evidence was based on confidential information and could not be shared in an open forum. Parliament held a hearing on PNR, at which four Member States and three third countries made presentations on their use of PNR and testified to their success. Given the confidential and sensitive nature of this information, however, the hearing was held
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I should like to say a few words on automated analysis methods, as this is a real issue. It is true that PNR are normally analysed automatically on the basis of risk indicators, but I must emphasise this: the Commission wants a guarantee that this sort of automated analysis will never lead to a decision directly affecting an individual. The results of automated analysis should always be analysed afresh manually by a specialist officer.
The Commission’s proposal suggests that PNR data should be used to prevent and combat terrorism and organised crime, and particularly drug trafficking and human trafficking, something you have certainly been prepared to recognise. I should add that PNR may be useful in combating other kinds of serious crime that are nothing to do with the world of organised crime. Despite that, we have limited the proposal to organised crime for reasons of proportionality.
Some Member States consider that PNR data could be of general use in combating illegal immigration, in safeguarding public health and for air safety. In the fight against illegal immigration, PNRs would be useful, since it is true that they make data available more quickly than Advance Passenger Information data. In the field of air safety, PNRs could be useful if the PNR system offered the possibility of refusing criminals or potential terrorists permission to board an aircraft, but the Commission’s proposal does not incorporate these powers.
As far as issues of public health are concerned, PNRs could be useful in preventing potential epidemics. If a passenger were to discover that he or she was suffering from a disease that had the potential to cause an epidemic, PNRs could be used to communicate with other passengers on the same aircraft and to offer them advice accordingly. Here too, however, the Commission’s proposal does not go this far, as proof of proportionality was lacking. I am sorry that I am unable to agree with you completely, but it seems to me that the purposes specified in the proposal are sufficiently precise to provide the legal safeguards that we should all wish to see.
You also raised the question of subsidiarity, and wondered whether a European initiative was needed. The Commission considers this European Union proposal to be necessary. Three Member States have already enacted domestic legislation on PNR data; several other Member States already make use of PNR data in other ways. A comparison of these systems reveals many differences with respect to both the duties placed on carriers and the purposes.
Such differences make passengers’ lives more complicated and certainly cause problems for carriers. The proposal is therefore intended to harmonise carriers’ responsibilities and to provide uniform rules for Member States making use of PNR data. At the same time, it also requires them to comply with our data protection mechanisms.
This agreement is the fruit of negotiations that began in March this year and which have been conducted by the Slovenian Presidency, assisted by the Commission. This agreement is valid for seven years. It is intended to provide legal protection to air carriers and reservation systems within the European Union with regard to PNR data transfer to the Australian Customs Service, while remaining compliant with EU data protection legislation.
Besides, this proposal will allow for more effective cooperation between police forces. Above all, the Commission believes that, in these times in which we find ourselves, international terrorism and crime pose serious threats, and that these measures must be taken to deal with these problems, while remaining completely respectful of human rights and fundamental rights.
You also raised the question of our choice of a decentralised framework for data collection, by saying: ‘Is it not the case, really, that in choosing a decentralised system, we lose the power of oversight?’ The Commission examined the alternatives of a centralised system as opposed to a decentralised framework, and, during our consultations with Member States, it became obvious that the processing of PNR data requires the use of information the source of which is extremely sensitive. For this reason, therefore, Member States were unwilling to share such information with a centralised European PNR entity.
It is true that a centralised system would be less expensive and would have certain advantages, but for reasons of practical politics we have chosen the alternative of a decentralised framework. From a data protection point of view, the decentralised option also allows each Member State to establish its own safeguards for access to and exchange of data
By way of conclusion, Mr President, I apologise for taking a long time, but this is an important matter touching on the exercise of democratic control by the European Parliament and national parliaments. The Commission is certainly aware that its proposal will be adopted according to a process of consultation. The Commission wants to be in close contact with you, with Parliament. National parliaments will be widely involved in the procedure, since the proposal is being or will be considered by most national parliaments. Data protection authorities will be involved in the PNR system and will be responsible for independent supervision of these systems.
That is why, Mrs in’t Veld, I recognise that your objections are serious. I have done my best to reply to them honestly. Nevertheless, I do think that this European framework is useful if we do not want each Member State to embark upon and commit to a completely divergent PNR initiative, carrying with it the definite risk of failure to observe a certain number of data protection rules.
As to usefulness, it is true that we must define usage and that we must pay close attention to proper use of these data, but it is also true that, in the fight against organised crime, we have such a need to become more efficient that I am inclined to think that an extra resource does not deserve to be overlooked. That is what I have to say quite simply in reply to your objections, to which I have listened with great care.
The agreement contains important undertakings taking account of concerns in the data protection field, of individuals’ rights to have access to personal information stored as a result of the agreement, and of the rights of individuals, regardless of their nationality, to lodge complaints with the Australian Privacy Commissioner regarding the manner in which their data have been processed.
Parliament has always been in favour of PNR data transfer based on what is known as the ‘push system’. After a transitional period, PNR data will be transferred to Australian Customs using only this ‘push system’. In other words, the Australian Customs Service will not have authorised access to these data directly from databases. Equally, the agreement contains important safeguards concerning the storage of PNR data, the transfer of such data to other agencies or third countries, as well as a clear reference to the purposes for which the data may be used.
As far as the purpose of the PNR data is concerned, the draft recommendation asserts that this is not compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In reply, I should say that the agreement provides that PNR data may be used for three purposes, which are specified. These are for combating terrorism and related crimes, combating serious crime – including organised crime – of a transnational nature, and third, combating the flight of persons from warrants and provisional custodial measures for the same crimes. If you so wish, I believe you can say in this case that the purposes have been defined.
For the sake of clarity, the agreement also provides that PNR data may be processed on a case-by-case basis where necessary for the protection of the vital interests of the person concerned. For the sake of clarity, the agreement provides that PNR data may be processed on a case-by-case basis where this is required by court order, for example in a case where the processing should be carried out in order to verify that the PNR data are being processed in accordance with Australian human rights law.
I should like to tell you that in future I shall take great care that Parliament play its part in such negotiations. I am completely cognisant of the need to keep you well informed. That being so, it seems to me that a certain number of guarantees have been obtained on the purpose of the data, on the use to which the data may be put and on the storage of the data. That being so, I have tried to be objective and I do nevertheless think that this agreement was necessary. Given that we have a willing partner, one with an institution charged with data protection, I really believe we have reasons for hoping that this agreement will be applied with complete respect for data protection.
I turn now most importantly, if I may say so, to the oral question that you put and which clearly poses the whole problem of PNR. International terrorism and crime constitute a serious threat, and it is true that the collection and analysis of PNR data appear to be an effective tool in the fight against terrorism and crime. PNR data are effectively commercial information provided by the passenger to the carrier on a voluntary basis. This is the information that is collected by carriers to operate their reservation systems.
Recently, some countries have begun to require carriers to transfer their PNR data to them as a means of preventing and combating terrorism and serious crime, such as human trafficking and drug trafficking. These countries include the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea. Those are a certain number of third countries, not the United Kingdom, who have begun to require carriers to transfer PNR data to them."@en1
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