Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2008-09-03-Speech-3-376"
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"en.20080903.27.3-376"2
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"Mr President, the proposal the honourable Members are debating today seeks to modernise rules adopted in 1989 on the market for the distribution of airline services.
I am therefore pleased at the speed with which Parliament has taken up this issue. I wish to express my appreciation of the work performed by your rapporteur, Tim Kirkhope, and the TRAN Committee, as well as the committees which expressed their opinions.
Computerised reservation systems (CRS) act as intermediaries between airlines and travel agents in the sales chain for air tickets. In the early 1990s, computerised reservation systems were practically the only channel for the sale of airline tickets. In addition, all the CRS were controlled by airlines. The latter were therefore more tempted to abuse their position in the CRS, for example, by biasing displays in their favour.
The code of conduct for the use of CRS establishes a number of safeguards to prevent abuse. It complements competition law since it adds measures to deal with sector-specific risks. It requires that all companies participating in the system are treated on a non-discriminatory basis. For example, the same fee is to be paid by all airlines. The Code also lays down special obligations for parent carriers – i.e. those which own or control the CRS.
The code of conduct has been very effective in preventing all kinds of abuse. However, since the code of conduct was introduced, the market for the sale of air tickets has changed considerably as alternative sales channels have developed. Today, nearly half of all reservations no longer go through a CRS but are made on internet sites or through airline call centres. The competitive pressure of these alternative sales methods has significantly reduced the risk of abuse through a CRS.
The new situation also requires an adjustment of the code of conduct. The rules laid down in the code of conduct significantly restrict the margin for negotiation between the CRS and airlines. The CRS are therefore not genuinely in competition with each other, and the fees paid to them by airlines and passengers are escalating.
The Commission’s proposal seeks to allow for more negotiation and, in particular, the possibility to set prices as regards the fee for the use of a CRS. This will enable airlines to negotiate the reduction of rates with the CRS. Boosting competition between the CRS will help to reduce costs and to improve the quality of the services they provide.
At the same time, the proposal maintains and strengthens the safeguards for the prevention of abuse and protection of consumers, and in particular the neutrality of information provided and the protection of personal data.
In addition, the proposal continues to impose special obligations on CRS parent carriers. The definition of ‘parent carrier’ has led to heated debates, since the obligations imposed on those companies are very burdensome.
Modernisation of the code of conduct will make it possible to reduce the cost of distribution of their services while guaranteeing the protection of consumers’ interests. This is urgently required from the viewpoint of the competitiveness of our industry, as our companies’ competitors already benefit from a liberalised environment and lower sales costs."@en1
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