Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2008-06-04-Speech-3-026"

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"Mr President, in our report, we wished to avoid repeating statements from previous reports on the European Security Strategy. Perhaps we have not entirely achieved this but I believe we can go further down this track in the future. For example, one point that was decided on in earlier reports and that we did not address again for precisely that reason, but that should be mentioned here, is the European Parliament’s support for the European Security and Defence College We would like this to become a real institution, not just a virtual one. Measured by European standards, time has passed very quickly since December 2003, when the European Security Strategy was adopted – perhaps not necessarily when measured by objective standards, but it can be said that the European Security Strategy has made significant practical progress during this time. There are some achievements to boast of, but I will not enumerate the different civilian and military missions here. However, what we can show, structurally, is that, for the last year or so we have had a civilian control and planning instrument on the Council side and that there is now a clear chain of command from the building over there right down to those who have to carry out operations on the ground. From the military perspective, we have strengthened operational capability beyond the use of NATO capabilities in accordance with the Berlin Plus Agreement. We have made the Battle Groups, which are supposed to work on rotation, operable. We have also carried out operations that we can declare successful, such as the missions in the area of the rule of law in Georgia and other similar missions. However, there are some tasks that still have to be undertaken and where, in my opinion, there are still deficits, and it does not make the Security Strategy any poorer if we list these points. When measured by the population figures for the EU Member States, there is an imbalance in the contributions to the missions, particularly in the civilian area. We therefore propose that the Member States be obliged – whether morally or by other means – to issue action plans detailing what staff capabilities they can make available to the European Union should it become necessary, including statements on the career prospects of people who return to their own country after serving on EU missions. In the long term, we cannot manage the agonising mechanism of providing troops for military actions such as Darfur and Chad, as we have done up to this point. We are therefore suggesting alternative options. We are also making several suggestions for dealing with the helicopter crisis and increasing the availability of helicopters. In the long term, it makes no sense for us in the European Union to be flying around in 24 different types of helicopter. In addition, there are new developments that we must consider as we reflect further on the Security Strategy. Terrorist activity has brought about a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external borders. Securing energy supply through diplomatic, economic and technical – and I am deliberately not saying military – means must be tackled. Securing sensitive infrastructures against electronic attacks is something we have become aware of. All these things need to be included in our consideration of aspects of the Security Strategy that may need to be expanded upon. Mr Solana, the EU High Representative, has a specific mandate from the Council to think about such things. We support him in that. We would hope to see the result of these deliberations towards the end of the year in the form of a White Paper so that there is a common reference point for European discussion, not only for discussion between Mr Solana and the governments, not only between him and us, not only in the national parliaments, but also in the interests of the European public, from Poland to Portugal."@en1

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