Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2007-12-12-Speech-3-355"
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"en.20071212.33.3-355"2
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".
Madam President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, it gives me pleasure to be able to present a report to you today that was adopted unanimously by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Before the vote in committee, the future of deposit-guarantee schemes was the subject of intense debate, particularly in the light of specific regional problems at the present time and of the recent crisis in the US property market.
If Member States with
systems were now to be asked to carry out a complete restructuring of their deposit-guarantee schemes at great expense, it would be necessary to analyse whether the diversity of the schemes and the accompanying unacceptable and expensive market distortions are at all justifiable in the internal market. This has not yet been analysed, and such an analysis will be an important task for the future.
The third part of the report examines risk and crisis management. The internal market and the increasing degree of cross-border interdependence require us to examine whether cross-border risk and crisis management works smoothly. There is an urgent need for in-depth discussions with all stakeholders. Long-standing issues such as the problem of free riders and the risk of moral hazard must be addressed in that context.
I believe that empirical studies analysing crisis and risk management are imperative if we are to work out viable arrangements for burden-sharing in the event of cross-border crises and common methods for early risk detection or develop a system for the introduction of risk-based contributions. These studies should then determine the content of subsequent discussions.
Against this background I also flatly reject the PSE amendment, which postulates existing market distortions although there is currently no evidence of these. We believe that the present process is the right approach.
At the end of 2006 the Commission presented a communication reviewing the 1994 Directive on deposit-guarantee schemes. Before drafting the communication, the Commission conducted a consultation process. On the basis of the empirical findings that emerged, we can conclude that the aims of the directive have essentially been achieved and that there is no need for any legislative intervention at the present time.
The increasingly cross-border nature of financial market structures in Europe, however, requires us to focus more sharply on the question of cooperation between the diverse deposit-guarantee schemes in Europe. In its communication, the Commission identified the areas in which self-regulation measures or different treatment of the legal bases could bring about further improvements in the interests of consumers.
This approach should, in our view, be pursued further. We believe that the dynamic discussion process involving the Commission, the Member States and the EFDI, the European Forum of Deposit Insurers, has a very useful role to play in enabling us to adapt as quickly as possible to changing circumstances.
The Nordea problem does not warrant calling for an expensive new amendment of the directive at the present moment. I am therefore grateful to the Commission for making it crystal-clear that the Nordea problem, which is essentially about the reimbursement of contributions, must be resolved by the Member States.
Those who operate the deposit-guarantee schemes in the Scandinavian countries and the supervisory authorities there must decide for themselves whether contributions are to be reimbursed or whether deposit guarantees in those countries should be treated like insurance policies and not give rise to refund entitlements. That is a fundamental problem, but it is a fundamental problem for the Member States.
The report can basically be divided into three parts. The first part is a discussion of the study undertaken by the Commission and the adoption of a position on its findings, such as the amount of the minimum guarantee. The second part addresses the question whether or not the diverse deposit-guarantee schemes in Europe cause unacceptable distortions of competition. The third part deals with future crisis and risk management.
On the first part of my report I intend to be very brief, since it proved largely non-contentious and reflects the findings of the consultation process on deposit-guarantee schemes. I believe our statement on the minimum coverage level, which should be adjusted for inflation when the directive is next revised, strikes a balance between the interests of the new Member States and those of the older ones. I should like to emphasise that every Member State and every deposit guarantor already has the option of exceeding the European minimum when guaranteeing deposits.
Another important point that is reflected in the report is the examination of the question whether the diverse deposit-guarantee systems and the various methods used to fund them are distorting competition. The Commission has set out its views and presented a study which, if its recommendations were implemented, would result in a harmonisation of funding for individual Member States."@en1
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