Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2007-03-28-Speech-3-082"

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". Madam President, it is good that Mrs Berès’ question on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs is being discussed and answered here today. This follows on seamlessly from the Muscat report, and also from yesterday’s debate in committee – in which the Commissioner also participated. The crisis simulation with a view to reviewing financial stability in the EU that was presented at the Ecofin meeting in Helsinki last September has indeed revealed shortcomings. This scenario – that is, constantly evolving financial instruments such as hedge funds and derivative financial instruments – illustrates the need for further debate that takes sufficient account of consumer security. Thus, we need a system of functional, interlinked supervisory rules and practices in the EU. Consumer protection, an effective financial industry and stable financial markets constitute the supreme objective of financial supervision, which must also help the industry fully utilise its potential and creativity. Therefore, good supervision must be guided by the existing risks and must take a principle-based approach instead of devoting itself to detailed individual analysis. It must not impose any additional burdens on enterprises, the rules must be developed in close contact with the financial industry, and cross-border financial markets must be dealt with at pan-European and global level in equal measure. Supervision should be limited to what is really necessary and useful. Existing measures should be used in a more cautious, more market-friendly way, avoiding imposing unnecessary burdens. At the present time, I strongly oppose a centralised European supervisory authority additional and parallel to the national supervisory authorities, as this would cancel out the EU principle of subsidiarity and lack any democratic legitimacy. Not only would a body such as this meet with a lack of understanding on the part of many, particularly as it would create additional non-transparent bureaucracy, but it would also be accompanied by a serious loss of sovereignty for the Member States, as it would disregard national budgets in the case of crises. Let us first wait and see how the supervisory bodies of the newly formed 27 come together and do their work. We do not need a uniform, centralised supervisory structure, but we do need a common supervisory culture characterised by the same values and objectives."@en1

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