Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2007-03-12-Speech-1-193"
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"en.20070312.23.1-193"2
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".
Mr President, thank you for allowing this debate to be organised on the ‘One share, one vote’ oral question. On 26 September 2006, a joint press communiqué from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) informed us that they had won the contract to compile a study on the ‘one share, one vote’ principle.
This is a point which our Parliament, during a previous parliamentary term, debated at length, not least at the time of the report on takeover bids. At the end of that long, well-argued and transparent debate, it was decided that, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the Member States would be allowed a certain amount of freedom regarding the ‘one share, one vote’ strategies, so as to define the way in which these strategies would work. The importance of management and of the other players as parties to corporate governance, whether they be employees, creditors, customers or suppliers, was also greatly emphasised on that occasion.
Nevertheless, as far back as October 2005, Mr McCreevy was confirming his determination to undermine the balance that had been reached at the time of the debate on the Directive on takeover bids, even before the workings of that directive had been evaluated and, what is more, even before that directive had been completely transposed into the Member States’ domestic law. At the same time, when considering the issue of shareholders’ status within companies and of seeing which shareholder strategy would be most conducive to an industrial strategy and to the development of Europe’s strengths as a business location, we see day after day that it would be beneficial, at times, to open a debate on the issue of building loyalty among one branch of shareholders.
Finally, we are aware of the importance that the current Commission, under Mr Barroso, attaches to impact studies, especially when it comes to defining the right strategy to be followed. At the time when this debate was launched, I said, ‘tell me whom you propose to have carry out the impact study, and I will tell you what their conclusions will be’. It seems to me that, in this instance, it is very likely that I will be able to predict those conclusions, insofar as those who have won the contract to carry out the study on the ‘one share, one vote’ principle are well known for having on many occasions advocated this very principle. We are therefore obliged to ask some questions, and that is the subject of the debate that we are going to initiate.
Why fund a study to the tune of EUR 450 000 when we already know what its outcome will be? What is the advantage of giving lobbies the means to fund their arguments, which are glorified by the results of a study backed by the European Commission?
I very much doubt that the joint contractors selected to carry out the study will really meet the general criteria of independence and objectivity that are required. It is also important to point out in this regard that, at the same time, in the United States, ISS’s activities are coming under more intense scrutiny from the financial markets supervisor, the SEC, and from the New York Stock Exchange, suspecting, as they do, a high risk of conflict of interest. Like the SECSI and the New York Stock Exchange, we should be alert to the disproportionate accumulation of information and influence by some large players in the chain of intermediaries and advisors involved in the exercise of shareholders’ voting rights in companies, and not react impulsively by giving added weight to those very shareholders.
Let us remember that, when our Parliament had the opportunity in July to give its verdict on the recent developments in, and prospects for, company law, it requested an objective analysis of the empirical and theoretical evidence regarding the effects of the different ownership models in the Member States on economic efficiency, owner-control of businesses and the possibilities for cross-border transactions. At the time, however, we also requested a sound analysis of corporate law as regards the wider economic and legal context in the Member States and the different models of corporate governance.
I do not have the impression that what the Commission has started by endorsing the proposal for a study by these two institutes provides us with the conditions for a debate that is equal to the challenge represented by the ‘one share, one vote’ issue. I hope, Mr Kyprianou, that you will be able to convey the concerns of this House to the Commissioner responsible, Mr McCreevy, and that, once the conclusions of the study are on the table, these concerns will be firmly established in people’s minds so that we can hold a responsible and effective debate on this issue."@en1
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