Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2007-01-31-Speech-3-117"
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"en.20070131.20.3-117"2
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"Mr President, I shall begin by addressing PNR. As you all know, the temporary agreement concluded in October with the United States will expire by the end of July this year, in a few months’ time. There is therefore the need to negotiate a very solid and stable legal framework which will enable the exchange of PNR data with the United States with full respect of data protection and privacy rights.
You are aware of the letter that I wrote to all of the Member States in November asking for information about the conditions under which their banks use personal data through SWIFT. Only seven Member States have so far replied to my request for clarification. This is unfortunate, and I will obviously be asking for a reason in certain cases: in the specific case of Italy, for example, it has requested more time to respond. In other cases, there has simply been no response.
From the seven responses that I have actually received – although no general conclusions can be drawn from them because too few Member States have responded – it emerges that banks normally use personal data for the sole purpose of executing payment orders and that they were not informed, in such cases, of the fact that personal data are transferred to the US Treasury by SWIFT. Therefore, the general response given is simply that they are not aware of the fact that someone, namely SWIFT, transfers data after having received it from them. However, it has emerged – but you already knew this – that, in many cases, central banks had been informed precisely by the US Treasury of the transfer of data from SWIFT Europe to SWIFT United States and from SWIFT United States to the US Treasury.
You are aware that actions and further investigations are being carried out by the national data protection authorities with the aim of shedding some light on the issue and of finding out whether, apart from the Belgian case, which is now well known, there are other specific cases in which national data protection authorities can open a file and thus start proceedings. Clearly, as soon as I have some information in this regard, I will pass it on to you, as I have done in the past.
There is a specific question concerning the possibility of applying the Automated Targeting System to SWIFT data. On the basis of the technical explanations given to me, it would appear impossible or highly unlikely for the system in question to have been used for processing SWIFT data, for the simple reason that it is part of the Department of Homeland Security, which relates to the protection of borders and thus to the movement of people passing through the US. It was not surprising that the European Parliament asked about the application of this mechanism to PNR data. SWIFT data are in a totally different category because they come under a different administration, which is the Treasury.
The question submitted also asks whether the Commission is aware of other examples of US authorities requesting data from private parties in this sector. I have no information on that, and so I cannot answer that question. There is no doubt, however, that, while the fight against the funding of terrorism is a vital instrument for preventing terrorism, this fight cannot undermine or limit a fundamental right, such as that of customers to have their personal financial data protected. As you know, one of the violations uncovered by the Belgian authorities and the European Committee for privacy protection is precisely the lack of prior information for customers, which coincides with what the banks said, since they had not been informed of these transfers either.
To conclude, Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that there are two reasons why we need to work towards a European instrument. Firstly, we cannot limit or destroy our Euro-Atlantic collaboration in relation to the fight against terrorism: that would be a serious mistake, which I believe the European Union should avoid making. Secondly, we must also point out to our American friends that it is in everyone’s interests for fundamental rights and the protection of personal data to be scrupulously adhered to. If, by virtue of having a European instrument, we succeed in doing the same thing that we are trying to do with the PNR – even though the two issues are very different, the principle is the same – and find a European solution that prevents differences in treatment between one EU Member State and another in relation to the United States, I believe that it will be possible to strengthen the European Union’s negotiating power and to demonstrate at the same time that our aim is to strengthen the Euro-Atlantic link, not to weaken it.
As the Presidency of the Council just said, the Commission has recommended to the Council that it authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission, to open negotiations on the basis of a set of negotiation directives. I am confident that these recommendations will be examined very soon. I personally strongly hope that by mid-February we will get a negotiating mandate to open this very difficult exercise.
The Commission is recommending to the Council to strive for full respect of fundamental rights, notably the right to privacy. I have said on a number of occasions that the right to privacy is for me non-negotiable. It has to be respected, fully and completely. Legal certainty is also an important element for air-carriers. It must be taken into account, as it has been from the very beginning. As I have already stressed in this Parliament several times, the Commission is committed to continuing to give due consideration to privacy on the one hand and legal security on the other, as they form key principles of this file, without forgetting the importance of preventing and fighting terrorism and related transnational crimes. The negotiations for a new agreement with the United States on PNR data are a key priority for the Commission, and for me personally, and I understand from what the Presidency of the Council just said that it shares this view. I warmly welcome the close cooperation between the Commission and the Council Presidency, which is crucial if we want to succeed, if we want to speak with one voice. On my side, of course, as usual, I will keep Parliament informed as this work progresses. You know very well that, as it was in the past, for me it will be a political commitment, though this document – for example, the negotiating recommendations – once approved will be classified as EU-restricted.
The negotiations will present a real challenge for Europe. It will require imagination; it will require a lot of common effort from all the EU institutions and from the United States as well in order to reach a very robust, solid solution.
To conclude, I would like to see, for example, this Parliament, together with the United States Congress – following the political phases of this very difficult exercise – making, perhaps for the first time, a joint political commitment which would be particularly useful for the ongoing negotiations. However, it is up to you to decide.
I shall now refer, ladies and gentlemen, to the SWIFT matter, which has also been addressed by the Presidency. You will recall that a few weeks ago, before the Christmas holidays, I informed the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs that the SWIFT case needed to be addressed from a European perspective, and I said on that occasion that we would begin an exploratory dialogue with the US authorities in order to address both the general issue of data protection and the specific issues raised by the use of SWIFT data by the US Treasury.
You will probably be aware that these informal, yet important, discussions have already begun. I am in favour of finding a European solution to addressing this issue, a European solution that ought, in my opinion, to include clear rules and precise guarantees, which the US Treasury should endorse and include in its documents. In other words, the two points at stake are, as ever, legal protection for personal data that are transferred and legal certainty for all parties concerned and, I must say, legal certainty for banks, too, for, as the Presidency has clearly highlighted, SWIFT is not a bank.
It is quite clear, then, that when I talk about guarantees from the US authorities, I intend to specify in which circumstances, for what purpose and by whom these data may be known and used. I would say right away that it must be made clear that the purpose is restricted solely to terrorism investigations and thus to preventing the funding of terrorism, so that we avoid the, albeit indirect, risk of such data being misused, for example for economic espionage purposes.
It is also clear that there seems to be a need for a further restriction, and that is to link the use of these data to research on specific individuals who are suspected of terrorist activity. In other words, there should be no non-specific transfers of data without suspects who warrant further investigation having first been identified."@en1
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