Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-12-14-Speech-4-232"
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"en.20061214.46.4-232"2
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"Mr President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, all of us in this House know how much the effectiveness of the markets determines the world economy. The term ‘markets’ here implies liquid assets and the capacity for financial instruments to be transferred rapidly, and this under optimum security conditions. The legal framework that regulates these transfers is an essential parameter when it comes to security. Because of globalisation, the chain of actors stretches across an ever increasing number of States, which raises this legitimate question: how does one determine the applicable law? The Hague Convention of 13 December 2002 was supposed to answer this question. If this Convention were to be ratified, then far from solving this problem, it would increase the systemic risks and undermine European institutions.
Given the – supposed - impossibility of defining an objective place in which the securities account is to be located, and, therefore, given the impossibility of determining the applicable law, the Convention gives priority to parties’ freedom of choice in deciding which law will apply to the contracts. This legal principle is opposed to the Community principle, PRIMA, which guarantees the location of securities accounts and was adopted in three directives: that on settlement finality (1998), that on collateral (2002) and, finally, that on the winding-up of credit institutions (2001).
For a start, let us consider the methods used. It is not normal for Parliament not to have been consulted on the negotiations conducted in the Hague, in particular on the abandonment of the location of account principle. There must be democratic control over negotiations undertaken in the context of the Hague Conference on private international law.
Basically, adopting this Convention would mean that Europe would be running a considerable risk, from investors to issuers. It would have a negative impact on the fight against money laundering, because it would make it potentially easier to bypass both obligations to declare suspicions and mechanisms to fight money laundering. It would have repercussions for delivery regulation systems, for prudential risks and for financial law, and particularly on the aim of preparing a European financial law. It must be added that free contractual choice would, in most cases, mean choosing the law with most influence in this sector, namely American law, which would reduce the competitiveness of European companies.
I would like to point out four things: firstly, the location of account is possible and it works very well in Europe; secondly, the prerogatives of the European Parliament must be respected; thirdly, it is essential to defend general European interests, especially the rights of European investors and the competitiveness of European companies in the financial markets; and fourthly, it is important to favour a framework that enables us to fight money laundering. This is why the Commission should withdraw its proposal to ratify the 36th Hague Convention."@en1
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