Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-10-25-Speech-3-231"
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"en.20061025.23.3-231"2
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"Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, recent developments in Moldova’s geographical and political situation have had an impact on the basic state of the Transnistrian conflict. Ukraine’s initiative to resolve the conflict in Transnistria since the Orange Revolution, the involvement of the European Union and the United States in the peace negotiations, and the activities of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) have strengthened Moldova’s unity. Transnistria has reacted to this by holding a referendum on 17 September. According to the Transnistrian authorities, the referendum resulted in overwhelming support by the people for independence and joining Russia.
Additionally, Georgia is demanding that the Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeepers, who in practice are all Russians, be replaced with an international operation both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with special emphasis on police activity. The view of the Georgian Parliament and Government is that these troops are not fulfilling their mandate and that their continued presence is questionable.
The EU is at present discussing internally the question of strengthening its role, but Georgia may have unrealistic expectations of the Union. The EU is encouraging the Georgian leaders to show restraint. Hasty decisions on the peace processes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are best avoided, for they might be a risk to the presence of the United Nations and the OSCE in the region. This, in turn, would create a vacuum in the regions. Georgia should undertake not to resort to force.
The EU Member States and the Commission made a significant contribution to the Donor Conference on Economic Rehabilitation for South Ossetia, which was held in Brussels in June. The conference was held on the basis of a needs assessment conducted by the OSCE. A significant international programme on economic rehabilitation will be started in South Ossetia this autumn, using funds collected at the conference.
Russia has an important part to play in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Support from Russia is needed in order to achieve results in the peace processes. The latest espionage scandal, however, has acutely exacerbated the already strained relations between Georgia and Russia. The EU has on many occasions sent strong messages to the leaders of the two countries, most recently to President Putin at Lahti, on the importance of normalising relations, and it has also offered its services to help reopen their dialogue.
At the end of October, the EU will discuss internally the progress of its role in the resolution of the conflicts in Georgia. Special Representative Semneby will have an important part to play in maintaining political dialogue between the EU and Georgia. He may also be able to promote the re-establishment of contact between Georgia and Russia. During its visit to Tbilisi on 2 October the EU Troika also stated that the EU is prepared to help Georgia resolve its conflicts by means of the European Neighbourhood Policy. A joint ENP Action Plan between the EU and Georgia has just been drawn up, which the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council will adopt formally at its meeting in Brussels on 14 November. The ENP Action Plan also contains a separate section on the resolution of the conflicts in Georgia.
The international community, including the European Union, has not recognised this or the earlier referenda in Transnistria. This was expressed clearly in the declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on 18 September, and also in the EU's positions stated at the meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in September and within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in July. In its declaration, the EU condemned the referendum, regarding it as contrary to Moldova's regional integration and its internationally recognised sovereignty. Moreover, the EU openly cast doubt on the idea that the outcome of the Transnistrian referendum actually reflected the will of the people.
The EU has also discussed the referendum with Russia on several occasions. Although the public statements made by Russia have given rise to other interpretations, Russia has assured the Union that it respects Moldova's territorial integrity and has denied supporting the referendum.
The activities of the EUBAM are an example of how the Union can best lend real support to the conflict resolution process in Transnistria and bringing the control of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border closer to European standards in general. Both Moldova and Ukraine have shown gratitude for the transfer of know-how to their border authorities. It is essential for efforts to resolve the conflict that the EUBAM should have helped to steer the supervision of Transnistrian foreign trade in the direction of the Moldovan authorities. This, too, contributes to Moldova’s national unity. The decision by Ukraine to start implementing the Ukrainian-Moldovan customs cooperation protocol in March has done much to improve the EUBAM's prospects.
It is the parties themselves which have the key roles in the Transnistrian peace process. The European Union hopes that the parties to the peace process will return to the negotiating table. The EU's chances of making an effective contribution to the process are bolstered by the Union's Special Representative, who participates in resolving the Transnistrian conflict in accordance with agreed EU policy objectives and in close coordination with the OSCE.
The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan between the EU and Moldova is the instrument that will enable the Union to lend purposeful, long-term support to Moldova. Ultimately, Moldova's development towards a politically and economically stable state may be the key to resolving the Transnistrian conflict. To achieve this, Moldova must, for example, improve its capacity for administration, extirpate corruption and foster a climate for investment. Moldova must make itself attractive to both foreign investors and Transnistrian businesses. The EU is committed to supporting Moldova in these efforts.
Now I will move on to the other topic of our debate. It has to be said that the European Union is extremely concerned about the tense relations between Russia and Georgia. This crisis is also affecting the situation in the separatist conflict zones in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the informal summit in Lahti last Friday, President Putin even warned that the situation might escalate into bloodshed. He blamed Georgia for preparing for war. In its conclusions of 17 October, the EU appealed to both Russia and Georgia to do their utmost not only to improve their bilateral relations but also to concentrate their efforts on finding a peaceful settlement to the conflicts. The Union also urged the parties to comply fully with earlier agreements.
The current situation in South Ossetia is tense. On 12 November a referendum will be held in the region for the purpose of consolidating the region’s independence. As with the referendum on independence in Transnistria, the European Union does not recognise this referendum. It may increase tension in the region further.
The European Union and the international community are aiding the resolution of the conflicts in Georgia in many ways. Through its observer status, the European Commission has an important role to play in the Joint Control Commission, the conflict resolution mechanism for South Ossetia. On many occasions Georgia has expressed the wish that the EU's role should be further strengthened. It also wants the JCC format to be changed by involving the EU and the United States of America, following the Transnistrian peace process 5+2 model. More recently, Georgia has called for the peace negotiations to be continued bilaterally between Georgia and South Ossetia."@en1
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