Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-12-13-Speech-2-319"
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"en.20051213.60.2-319"2
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".
The case began in 2002 and there have been ebbs and flows in the workload over that time. During that time, there has been one primary case handler working on the case part-time while carrying out other work in the Directorate-General. The case has also involved the hierarchy of DG Competition and the Cabinet at appropriate stages.
The Commission does not accept the suggestion that this was not a genuine competition case. Football is an extremely popular sport, as we all know, and the way in which its media rights are sold can have significant long-term effects on the development of the media markets. The importance of this case is shown by the number of companies, free-to-air and pay-TV broadcasters, internet operators, mobile operators and potential new entrants who have expressed their concerns to the Commission and, on occasion, to the relevant national authorities in the course of this case.
In addition, both the Office of Fair Trading and the Office of Communications strongly supported both the existence of the Commission’s investigation and its focus. Finally, the UK Consumers’ Association published its own report into these issues, concluding that there was a genuine consumer problem and that the cause of that problem lay in the manner in which the English Football Association Premier League jointly sold the rights to Premier League games.
The Commission does not agree, therefore, that it would have been more efficient or appropriate to investigate the broadcasting market for potential abuse of a dominant position. Where there are concerns about dominance, it is appropriate for a competition authority to look closely at the causes of that dominance. Where dominance exists on a downstream market, at least in part as a result of upstream agreements that potentially infringe Article 81, the most efficient and effective course of action is to look at those upstream agreements. The joint selling of football rights risks creating a seller with market power and the consequent transfer of that market power downstream. The joint selling can cause competition problems downstream and therefore deserves close examination. To treat only the downstream dominance without looking at the upstream rights contracts would be to treat the symptom of the competition problem rather than one of the causes."@en1
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