Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-07-07-Speech-4-194"

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"Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I agree more or less with what was said and with what is included in the resolution. Obviously, Mugabe’s regime is an inadmissible one that is doing absolutely unacceptable and abominable things. We agree about that. I spend a lot of time in those African countries, and I am utterly dismayed to see this vicious circle whereby the more tyrannical Mugabe is and the more the European Union and other international bodies intervene to condemn him, the more popular he is. If, however, this vicious circle did not exist, Mugabe would undoubtedly not last for long, for it is only through this mechanism that he holds on to power. What Mr Meijer said is true: it is this mechanism that is the key. To summarise, there is a need to be very careful when attacking the African Union and the African leaders in the region. I absolutely deny that we are the poodles of Mugabe’s regime. I can tell you that I myself am by no means any such thing, and I can say this after having tried on many occasions to get things moving in South Africa. At one point, South Africa tried to convince Mugabe to transform his government into a government of national unity, opening it up to Mr Tsvangirai and his party. At one point, things had moved in the right direction. Then, along came the sanctions, which again created an extremely difficult climate. I vigorously condemn Mugabe’s attitude. I believe that the planned measures and sanctions should be applied against the Zimbabwean authorities. There is no reason for not applying them. That goes without saying. I agree with most of what is contained in the resolution. I am simply trying to explain to you the limits of what we can usefully do, because the problem is, in fact, one of doing things that are of use. That being said, I should like, all the same, to introduce a few qualifications regarding the tactical or strategic responses that are to be made, given the regime that is in place and the means available to us to move things in the right direction. When you speak of sanctions, for example, I obviously share your point of view concerning sanctions directly affecting the Zimbabwean authorities. They definitely must be applied. I would even add: what are we waiting for before applying them? Obviously, I agree. That being said, it needs carefully to be borne in mind that certain types of sanction have harmful repercussions on populations. In general, I am not, moreover, in favour of sanctions. I tend, rather, to be in favour of political dialogue. It has in fact been seen how, when they affect populations, sanctions generally rebound upon those who apply them, rather than target the authorities at whom they were directed. That is the first thing I wanted to say. What I should now like to say, I say in the knowledge that my comments make me vulnerable to criticism. It would not, however, be right for me not to let you know my feelings regarding this debate. It is very easy for us, as Europeans, to issue press releases almost every day, denouncing and attacking Mugabe. You should be aware, however, that, every time Mugabe is attacked, his symbolic importance as a black hero in relation to the evil white colonisers is reinforced. As someone – Mr Meijer, I think – said a few minutes ago, Mugabe is clearly making use of this vicious circle to rehabilitate himself politically and in the popular imagination. That needs to be acknowledged. There is something else you ought to know, too. Otherwise, you will not be fully informed. Together with yourselves, I certainly recognise that maximum pressure has to be exerted, but it has to be exerted in a subtle way. What also needs to be understood is that the leaders of the other African countries, whom you denounce for not daring to adopt positions, or make value judgments, on Mugabe’s behaviour are put in difficult positions in their own countries every time Mugabe reinforces his symbolic, not to say heroic image. You need to know this and you also need to know that it is extremely difficult for Mr Mbeki, and I would say straight away that the old boy network … no, but of course not, there is no old boy network; I am sorry; it is an insult to the South African President to speak of an old boy network. What Mr Mbeki and other African leaders in the region fear is, in reality, that the phenomenon of violence and of an anti-colonialist uprising somewhere might spread into neighbouring countries. I have on many occasions broached this issue with the representatives of the African Union and with the various Heads of Government of these neighbouring countries. I am able to tell you that they certainly want to put pressure on President Mugabe, but that they want the conditions to exist for doing so. In order to bring those conditions about, it is not enough, moreover, for the community outside Africa to relaunch the debate and wave the threat of sanctions, insisting on more of these and on the need to take a harder line. Firstly, what is meant by the need to take a harder line? Someone tell me what has to be done. Do troops need to be sent in? What should be done? President Barroso was extremely vigorous in his condemnation of Mugabe’s attitude following the expulsions that took place recently. I should like someone to explain to me what, apart from that and apart from the vengeful, sometimes cavalier, press releases and the routine chest-baring, is meant by taking a harder line. Alternatively, we could engage in a debate on the duty, or right, to interfere. I personally am ready to engage in that debate. I am not indifferent to such a debate. I suspect, however, that, on the day that the demand is made in this House for troops to be sent to Zimbabwe to bring about order there – in which case, the agreement of the African Union will still be required – great harm will be caused to Africa and to its regional institutions. I also very much doubt that any candidates would be found in this House for assembling the bulk of the troops needed. All I want to say is that an attempt at coherence is needed when points of view are defended. We are not just a sounding board. The European bodies, and I too, need at some point to be told precisely what these additional things are that need to be done. There is no end of condemnation going on. I met President Konare in Syrte four days ago, together with President Barroso. Our conversation basically consisted of our saying: but, President, why do you yourselves, as the African Union, not condemn Mugabe’s conduct? To which he would reply: but, my dear friend, every time you attack Mugabe, you make matters much more difficult for us because our peoples do not consider Mugabe to be a tyrant or dictator; they consider Mugabe basically to be standing up to the evil colonisers, embodying genuine resistance and being faithful to history. That is what I hear, and I believe it. Even though I know that this is impossible, there is almost a need, for a few weeks, to adopt a low profile and not to talk too much about all this. I am almost convinced that doing so would put the African Union, the regional organisations, President Mbeki and others in a position to exercise their peer review duty. I am almost convinced that you would be putting them in a position to do this. As long as we continue ostentatiously to lambast Mugabe’s attitude with press releases and calls for vengeance, we shall not – and I am sorry to have to tell you this – be able to obtain the judgment we await from the African Union and the African organisations. It is only by obtaining such a judgment that we can in the end exercise influence. That is what I believe. I do not think that there is any other way in which we shall succeed in doing this. That is something you should know."@en1
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"(In response to heckling by one MEP, Mr Michel breaks off)"1

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