Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-12-13-Speech-1-151"
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"en.20041213.10.1-151"2
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".
Mr President, I thank you and the honourable Members for a very rich, analytical and multi-dimensional debate, which has covered virtually the whole spectrum of European public opinion ranging from future peace dividends to past crusades and, more seriously, from women's rights to religious communities and their rights in Turkey.
Mr Swoboda, Mr Szent-Iványi and several others made the very important point that if we succeed in this long process of negotiations, it should and will make the EU strategically stronger. This is the fundamental issue at stake here and the strategic, geopolitical and geocultural crux of the matter. We can learn some lessons from history – we do not have to apply them blindly, but we can indeed learn something. During the Cold War, Europe contained Communism and the Soviet Union and cooperated in terms of enhancing security and human rights with impressive results. We can see this from the significant number of colleagues from free eastern and central Europe who are here among us today as Members of this Parliament.
Now and in the future, the challenge is very much the relationship between Europe and Islam. Europe must, on the one hand, contain Islamic fundamentalism using all the means available and, on the other hand, it must build bridges and dialogue with those representing moderate Islam. If, after long and difficult negotiations, we achieve a situation where the rule of law genuinely prevails in Turkey, and where European democracy meets a predominantly Muslim population, then that would certainly be an asset for Europe and a very important crossroads of civilisations.
I will touch on a limited number of questions that Members addressed directly to the Commission. First, there have been numerous requests for rigorous monitoring of legal reforms and human rights in general. I fully agree with this. The rigorous monitoring mechanism and the annexed suspension clause are indeed at the core of our negotiation strategy with regard to Turkey in the coming years. It is also very much in the interests of Turkey because it maintains the strong incentive to implement and consolidate the necessary legal and political reforms. We will be preparing a monitoring report during 2005 concerning the fulfilment of criteria in the field of human rights in general.
These criteria include the issue of trade union rights, which Mr Rasmussen raised. He referred to an ongoing court case of which the Commission is aware. We are monitoring this case very closely. In our report we consider this to be a serious test case with regard to the depth of legal reform in Turkey, which touches upon trade union rights, language rights and the rights of minorities in Turkey. This also involves the question of non-Muslim religious minorities, which has been addressed in depth by Mr Eurlings in his report and referred to by several Members here this evening. I would like to underline that although freedom of religion is guaranteed by the Turkish constitution, non-Muslim religious communities nevertheless face a series of structural difficulties, such as the lack of a legal personality and the lack of full economic rights. The Turkish authorities are committed to adopting a law addressing these structural problems. A draft law on foundations is currently being discussed and the Commission has been officially invited to submit its comments to the Turkish authorities on this critical piece of legislation. We will continue to have dialogue and put pressure on the Turkish Government on this particular subject.
Concerning the enforcement mechanism of the suspension clause, to which Mr Duff referred, the origin of the suspension clause lies in the development of the
. The Union now has clauses in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union and in the draft Constitutional Treaty that provide for a procedure to deal with cases where a Member State seriously and persistently breaches the basic principles of the Union. It is only logical and normal that similar rules should also apply to candidate countries. In fact, it has always been the case even in the past that such serious situations would lead to a suspension of negotiations. Thus the inclusion of an explicit suspension procedure is based on a new
and the Commission will base its proposal on these principles of the Treaty. Thus I am fully in agreement with Mr Nicolaï and with Mr Duff.
On the question of the privileged partnership, the instrument of a special partnership is provided for under the draft Constitutional Treaty. It is intended to give special treatment to neighbours or other partners representing a strategic interest for the European Union. The idea of the special partnership underlines in particular the New Neighbourhood policy, which the EU seeks to extend to its eastern and southern neighbours. This initiative does not apply to Turkey, which has been a candidate country since the Helsinki summit in 1999. It is hard to figure out how any more could be offered to Turkey than it already has under the privileged partnership.
First of all, Turkey and the EU are bound by a customs union which constitutes a far-reaching instrument of bilateral cooperation in the area of trade and economic cooperation, implying a great degree of economic integration. Second, Turkey already participates in numerous Community programmes in a wide range of areas such as culture, drugs, justice and home affairs, education, research and development. Third, in the key area of security and defence, Turkey participates as a NATO member – via both NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy – in the development of EU security operations. For instance, there are Turkish troops in many countries in the Balkans, and even in the 'European army', as one British newspaper recently dubbed the 'Althea' operation in Bosnia.
With regard to the privileged partnership, and as Mr Nicolaï also said, in my view the clear objective of the accession negotiations will and should be accession if Turkey meets all the criteria for membership by the end of the negotiations. It would not be wise to set any final target date because we have recently learned that schedule should not override substance. We should set realistic targets, not deadlines that we cannot meet.
Finally, Mr Howitt asked about the start-date from the point of view of the Commission. Our mandate is to evaluate whether Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. This is what we did. Concerning the start-date of the negotiations, we trust the wisdom of the European Council, of the Prime Ministers and Presidents to make the political judgement with regard to when in 2005 they deem it appropriate to start the accession negotiations.
From the point of view of the Commission, I can say that we are ready to start work – in the words of Parliament's resolution – 'without undue delay'. I only hope that somebody will explain to me the difference between 'undue' and 'due' delay. Nevertheless, we are ready to work without delay once the negotiations have been made and the process can be started."@en1
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