Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-03-10-Speech-3-261"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20040310.6.3-261"2
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spoken text |
". – Mrs Ahern has raised a very serious question. The recent revelations about the secret network illicitly trading in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology organised by the former Pakistani chief scientist, Abul Qadeer Khan, are of very serious concern. During the recent European Union ministerial troika to Islamabad, these concerns were raised at the highest level with Pakistan and we were assured that new controls have been put in place in order to prevent proliferation.
As far as the European Union is concerned, exports of sensitive equipment and technology are regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000. With regard to the export of weapons-usable materials – for example plutonium and highly enriched uranium – from the European Union, this can only be authorised in accordance with the above-mentioned regulation, as well as other relevant international rules and practices governing such exports. Furthermore, all nuclear material within the European Union – as long as it remains in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle – is safeguarded by the nuclear inspection services of the Commission and, where the material is to be transferred outside the European Union, by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In the case of export to third countries, the IAEA will also apply safeguards to the third country and will, inter alia, verify the declaration on quantity and composition made before the shipment of any material.
In the specific case of Pakistan, the issue raised by the Member, there is an additional consideration. Unlike all European Union Member States, Pakistan is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and does not have a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The principles and the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and the disarmament agreed at the 1995 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference state that full-scope safeguards should be a necessary precondition for transfers of source and special fissionable material or specially designed material thereof.
The nuclear suppliers group and the export control regime in which all EU Member States participate designates full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply for sensitive nuclear and related technology. It follows that no Member State should authorise the export of nuclear material in any form to Pakistan.
The Council is committed to continuing to strengthen export control policies and practices in cooperation with our partners in various export control regimes and in other third countries. This is reflected in the EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the last European Council meeting in December in Brussels."@en1
|
| lpv:unclassifiedMetadata |
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples