Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-02-11-Speech-3-161"
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"en.20040211.6.3-161"2
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"Mr President, Commissioner Bolkestein, ladies and gentlemen, the Parmalat collapse and other worrying financial crises before and after it have revealed the limitations of the rules governing our financial markets.
As happened in the United States, on the crest of the
affair, and in the United Kingdom, with its 34 defaulting scandals, in Italy too we immediately realised the need to introduce strict legislation in order to protect savers more effectively and – in a broader sense – to attempt to limit the discredit that would inevitably affect the financial market involved.
In these cases, though, we have to put aside emotional reactions and, in particular, we should not allow ourselves to be swayed by the appearance, however serious, of what has occurred and by the incentives that may result from it. Similarly, I do not support exceptional measures, such as the possibility of a monitoring super-authority, because we would run the risk of creating a new body that would have difficulty in making any additional contribution to an environment that must be restructured.
The measures in force have to be well implemented and certainly need to be redesigned. The bankruptcy law could also play a key role: the
principle and the ‘suspect period’ should also play a role in both extraordinary administration and controlled administration. This would reinforce the protection of creditors. Furthermore, the credit system, which is certainly not entirely blameless in the case of Parmalat, would not be the sole arbiter of events. These would, however, be subject to the assessment of a designated judge.
So, to continue on the subject of far-reaching proposals, we would need to increase the information available on all financial products available to the public, both in
prospectuses and in
communications
and to eliminate the problem of the patchiness of the information on the different financial products available to the public. Transparency monitoring must be extended to everything, including banking and insurance products offered to savers, which contain a management input. The introduction of stricter areas of incompatibility to protect the independence of inspection bodies will be inevitable. In the case of bond-issuing firms, however, more needs to be done: documents binding on the company will need to be issued, stating what the company will do, when it will do it and what investment products will be used. Above all, though, in addition to accounts auditors, we will need to put in place a figure that has already existed in the United States for ten years: the ethics officer. This figure, who acts as a form of listener, or identifier of signals, must be able to pick up on even weak danger signals that escape the attention of analysts, who focus on evidence. When reading the work of the ethics officer, it is possible to identify not only management results, but
on the outside
the extent of the firm’s reliability."@en1
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"par condicio creditorum"1
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