Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-02-11-Speech-3-047"
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"en.20040211.2.3-047"2
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I welcome the opportunity to contribute to this debate today although, inevitably, I will traverse some of the ground that has been so ably covered by the presidency.
I am grateful for the opportunity to have taken part in this short but important debate on a matter of such international significance.
Recent revelations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea have highlighted the importance of maintaining and strengthening effective controls. It is a matter of historic record that the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in the 1990s and the consequent impact on regional stability gave rise to grave concern. North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons last year was a further dangerous and destabilising step, both for the immediate region and the international community as a whole.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – NPT – which entered into force in 1970, established the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as we know it. This regime established the basic norms for behaviour. It provides – as the House will know – a legal ban on nuclear proliferation beyond the five nuclear weapons states recognised by the Treaty and makes nuclear proliferation activity illegal in the international community. With it came the principle of regulated nuclear trade, the concept of nuclear safeguards and, of course, the International Atomic Energy Authority, whose excellent work underpins the regime.
Understandably, much of the focus has been on the regime’s failures, but we often underestimate the success. In a 1960 presidential debate, John F. Kennedy envisaged a world with perhaps 20 nations with a nuclear capability. That his vision was never realised has been due, in large part, to the creation of the NPT. South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea, for example, have all turned their backs on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, partly because of international pressure, but also as a result of sensible and wise decisions taken in response to domestic debate and opinion. We also have positive recent developments with Iran, which has now accepted the Additional Protocol, and Libya.
Against this background, while recognising the challenges that the NPT faces, particularly on nuclear proliferation and disarmament, we believe the forthcoming third preparatory committee can be approached with some confidence. There may well be shortcomings in the non-proliferation regime but they are certainly not terminal and they can, in our judgment, be addressed. We must continue to pursue the universal adoption of the NPT by countries that have so far refused to do so, and in particular India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea must return to conformity with the Treaty. We must also extend the ratification of the important Additional Protocol to the Treaty. This Protocol provides the IAEA with enhanced and tougher powers to perform inspections. In this context, the Commission's role is first in assisting the presidency, which sees progress in this area as a high priority, and second in encouraging the maximum degree of EU coordination.
The last 12 months have seen the EU take enormous strides in strengthening its approach to non-proliferation. The European security strategy that was adopted at the December 2003 European Council identifies weapons of mass destruction as one of the most dangerous threats to today’s Europe. At the same European Council, the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was approved. This strategy is now being followed up by concrete action. Work on implementation of the strategy is proceeding in a large number of areas which are too numerous to set out today, but I will highlight a number of important examples.
The first was last November’s adoption by the General Affairs and External Relations Council of a text aimed at mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the European Union’s wider relations with third countries, among other things, by introducing a non-proliferation clause in agreements with them. This new commitment on non-proliferation is important, because the new EU strategy aims to include provisions on non-proliferation in all agreements with third countries. This is now part of ongoing negotiations, for example with Syria, placing non-proliferation on a similar level to human rights and the fight against terrorism.
The EU Joint Action for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Russia was established by the Council in 1999 to enhance cooperation with the Russian Federation in the latter’s pursuit of a safe, secure and environmentally sound dismantlement, destruction or conversion of those WMD infrastructures, equipment and materials. The projects support chemical destruction and the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium. These projects, which are implemented by the Commission in close cooperation with a number of Member States, are a small but important part of the Community’s EUR 1 billion contribution to the G8 Global Partnership, launched at the meeting in 2002 in Canada.
The Interparliamentary Conference hosted by the Commission under the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Cooperation Initiative on 20 and 21 November 2003, which took place here in Strasbourg, highlighted the considerable future challenges ahead if we are to safely dispose of the dangerous remains of Cold War WMD programmes. The conference’s significance was confirmed through its status as an interparliamentary gathering of figures from key national parliaments, including the United States Congress and the Russian Duma. For the WMD threat to be removed it must become and remain a high priority issue for national governments, regional organisations and the international community as a whole. From a Community perspective, we are grateful for the increased attention given by the European Parliament to the need to adequately fund threat-reduction activities in the next budget cycle. The Commission, in cooperation with the European Parliament, is seeking to define future non-proliferation priorities and, thanks to a recent decision by Parliament, will be able shortly to launch a pilot project to further this work."@en1
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