Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-01-13-Speech-2-050"
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".
Mr President, I am going to try to respond very quickly to the various interventions made, which, broadly speaking, seemed to me to be along the same lines and to express similar views. Firstly, on the scope of application of the text, your rapporteur indicated just now that she would perhaps have preferred the Commission to be a little more ambitious at this stage.
It is true that for the time being we are only proposing instruments for future regulatory agencies. Why? The reason for this is quite simply that we want to start with what is immediately feasible and it seems to us that if we had to work initially on streamlining the existing agencies with their very disparate characteristics, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to adopt a truly uniform approach. We therefore favour a uniform approach and wish to apply it first of all to future agencies.
As far as the legal instrument is concerned, I do not think that we disagree: a framework regulation is required, as you propose. This is a binding legal instrument for the application of common principles, which in this case is exactly what we are looking for. The advantage of having such an instrument on the regulatory agencies is that it would exist in parallel to the framework regulation on the status of the executive agencies, which was adopted by the Council in December 2002.
Turning now to the substance – and I think that we are in full agreement on all of these points – I noted that several principles emerged from your discussion: efficiency, supervision and responsibility, all subject to an overriding principle of parsimony, which I thought your rapporteur expressed very well.
On the principle of efficiency, we agree, and in particular we need to apply our good resolutions on efficiency to the structure and composition of the agencies. It is clear that if the administrative boards are excessively large and if the selection of the directors calls for permanent consultations then we will not achieve our aims. We therefore need to be disciplined enough to keep these in check and I think that we will be able to work together on this point.
The second principle is supervision. Many of you have said that whether it be from a legal, administrative or financial point of view, these agencies, which are, as it were, Commission outposts, need to be subject to greater supervision the further they are from the seat of the executive authority.
The third principle is the principle of responsibility. You said this and we agree with you on this point: the Commission bears the political responsibility and its agencies, even the regulatory agencies, work under the Commission’s political responsibility, which you must be able to call into question: it is, after all, your right and your duty to do so.
Finally, all of this, and I will conclude on this point, implies a principle of parsimony. We have to admit that it is sometimes tempting to resolve this or that problem by creating an agency; together we need to be able to resist this temptation. We need a good means for preventing proliferation and it would seem, having listened to your debate, that your intentions in this respect are perfectly in line with those of the Commission. I conclude then that we are well provisioned with criteria and principles that will enable us to improve the current situation, which is, it is true, starting to bear a strong resemblance to a plate of spaghetti."@en1
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