Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-10-08-Speech-3-127"
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".
Mr President, I would like to thank everyone who has taken part in the debate for their valuable contributions, and I would particularly like to thank Mr Della Vedova, the rapporteur for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Mr Doorn, draftsman for the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market.
My final point, Mr President, concerns workers' rights, a subject raised by Mr Berenguer Fuster, Mrs van den Burg and Mr Santos, and an issue on which other Members disagreed with them. I believe - like those dissenting voices - that we are all working within the social market economy, and we consider workers' rights to be of the utmost importance. In fact, as has already been mentioned, appropriate instruments exist at Community level, but we believe there is a need for appropriate allocation of the various instruments to a range of different objectives. The regulation on concentrations is principally concerned with the components of the social market economy, and we do not, therefore, believe that it should be cluttered with measures to stimulate or safeguard employment: there are other instruments for that. In any case, the notifications are in the public domain, so that interested parties, including trade union representatives, are kept fully informed of whatever merger operations are in progress. We have, in any case, welcomed, and, what is more, at times actually sought the input that workers' representatives can provide in the procedure.
I would like to thank all the speakers once again for their contributions and, in particular, Mr Della Vedova and Mr Doorn.
I am delighted to see that, by and large, the report supports the Commission's proposal, and that we share the same general objectives with regard to the need for reform. The Commission is, however, I am afraid, unable to accept the various amendments tabled. I would like to explain why, although, for, reasons of time I shall have to be brief, starting with the substantive test in the regulation on concentrations.
The Commission has come to the conclusion that the substantive test should be clarified, by adding a few words to the present text - words that the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs wish to see removed. Why do we think that this change is needed? Many observers believe that the present test may not be adequate to cope with concentrations that raise competition problems in cases of what is known as ’non-collusive oligopoly’. If this is true, opting to keep the dominant position test as it is would mean failing to take advantage of an opportunity to make it clear that the substantive test for assessing concentrations will be applied without fail to all concentrations harmful to consumers' interests. I would also like to emphasise that the prevailing view in international economic literature is that oligopoly situations arising from concentrations can have long-term anticompetitive effects and thus harm consumers' interests.
The Commission brought forward its proposal because it had become aware of the need to guarantee maximum legal certainty, an objective which it seems to me was generally shared and supported by various speakers, including Mr Olle Schmidt, Mr Ilgenfritz, Mr Santos and others. The greatest legal certainty you can have here is a genuinely effective instrument for controlling concentrations. We are convinced that the wording proposed would provide the greatest legal certainty possible.
As regards jurisdiction, a subject covered in depth in the Della Vedova and Doorn reports, and one on which various speakers commented, including Mr Berenguer Fuster and Mr Karas, I believe we all agree that it is necessary to achieve a sensible division of labour between the Commission and the Member States, thus minimising the burdens on companies and on public regulatory authorities. This means having allocation thresholds which, as far as possible, reflect an optimum division, and applying a referral system that can, so to speak, rectify incorrect allocations as far as is possible. We therefore propose to simplify and make more flexible the provisions for referring cases from the Commission to Member States and vice versa, thus also making it possible, as some companies have indicated would be helpful, for referral to take place even before notification.
What lies behind our position on the amendments proposed in relation to jurisdiction? Your report, Mr Della Vedova, proposes a ‘2+’ rule combined with new turnover thresholds. I fully appreciate the intentions behind the proposed amendment, but I believe that it would introduce an additional complication, because companies would first have to find out where to notify an operation. That is the reason, Mr Berenguer Fuster, why we, ourselves, dropped the idea, appealing as it is, of a ‘3+’ system, because it would come up against the situation of non-harmonised national legislation on concentrations, for the time being at least. This might be a longer-term objective, but it is not one for today.
As regards partial referrals to Member States, I agree that we should keep these to a minimum, but I also believe that it would not be advisable totally to rule out such referrals, because they may be appropriate in some cases.
I now wish to turn to a subject that has attracted a lot of attention and concern. The Commission has also proposed that its own powers of enforcement, as laid down in the regulation on concentrations, should, to a large extent, be brought in line with the new regulation, Regulation 1/2003. There are, in particular, two exceptions, namely the power to search private homes and the power to conduct investigations into sectors of the economy, which we, too, do not believe to be necessary for controlling concentrations. We do not, therefore, propose to introduce such powers.
I can assure you that, like you, we believe that there should not be any presumption that the law is being breached in concentrations, and that they are, therefore, effectively different from cartels, for example. That much is clear. I would like to reassure the rapporteur, Mr Della Vedova, the draftsman, Mr Doorn, and also Mr Karas, Mr Mann and other Members about this basic principle. It is therefore only right that our powers of enforcement should not be any more extensive than necessary. Nevertheless, our priority objective is to ensure that these powers are sufficiently effective to allow the Commission to discharge its duties and to protect consumers against the risk of harm from anticompetitive concentrations, and I believe that the powers we have proposed are necessary to this end. Of course, you may well argue that, as control of concentrations is an area different from other aspects of competition, less draconian powers are needed here than those required, for instance, to combat cartels. Although I have said that these are two different areas, forgive me if I come to a different conclusion about enforcement powers. Why? Because concentrations have a unique one-off if you like structural impact on the market, which is irreversible. For this reason, there is an argument that it is even more vital for the Commission to have effective powers to collect information, as otherwise we may reach a decision whose consequences for competition would be irreparable."@en1
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