Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-06-30-Speech-1-060"
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"en.20030630.9.1-060"2
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"Mr President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, the report being debated today is vital for harmonising financial markets, since it will allow securities to be quoted on the stock exchange lists of all European markets. It is also vital, however, as it guarantees a uniform standard of information. This is necessary if markets are to be transparent and secure, and therefore if they are to function properly. This report also sets out to guarantee that all parties are given full information on the securities quoted.
There is no doubt that the Greek Presidency’s compromise represents a laudable balance which allows the different European approaches to market regulation to be reconciled. When I hear my fellow Member from Britain make the case for the language regime, however, a flicker of suspicion stirs within me. For while I can understand that a Dutchman, a Frenchman or an Italian might make the case for a language regime which is not designed to protect markets, I imagine a different concept of market protection when I hear it from the mouth of a Londoner.
More seriously, at this stage in the Parliamentary process, I would like to discuss two matters which, I feel, are not minor details but remain pressing questions. The first is the choice of competent authority for convertible bonds, by which I basically mean Eurobonds. I feel that if we leave the choice of competent authority to companies, we encourage the lowest-bidding regulator. The issuing companies will naturally gravitate towards the least parsimonious authorities. We therefore risk weakening the markets. I accept the distinction established between debt and capital. Small investors, indeed, are not concerned with bonds. We can thus tolerate a lesser degree of rigour. On the other hand, I find it unacceptable to admit free choice for bonds. They allow access to a company’s capital and are one of the two forms of new equity issue. Moreover, these equities are liable to be held by the public, and this will increasingly be the case in future. On this point, the Presidency’s compromise appears satisfactory.
The second problem is the delegation of powers by the authority. In the Member States where such delegation exists, the stock exchanges to which these tasks are delegated have very often become private profit-making organisations. They are thus
both judge and judged after the prospectuses have been inspected. That poses undeniable problems relating to the quality of scrutiny of the prospectus and possible distortions of competition. I feel that the eight-year period allowed in the Presidency’s package for the Member States to come into line with this reality of business life really is the longest acceptable time limit. It should allow us to put an end to this type of delegation. These two questions remain pressing. A few other details might be worth mentioning here: the possibility of SMEs or natural persons considered as qualified investors opting out of this statute; the fact that if a competent authority has not scrutinised a prospectus within the prescribed time limit, that prospectus is approved; the problem of languages, which I have mentioned briefly.
To sum up, Mr President, I hope that Parliament votes in favour of the Greek Presidency’s compromise, a solution which is acceptable to all concerned."@en1
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