Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-06-04-Speech-3-179"
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"en.20030604.5.3-179"2
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". Madam President, there are a number of interesting questions framed by Mr Brok which hint at concerns we should try to address about the good health of our current dialogue with the United States. Those on both sides of the Atlantic who are already engaged in the intensive preparations for next month's EU-US summit to which the Presidency referred and in finalising an impressive list of deliverables, should, I believe, be able to reassure the honourable Member.
In the humanitarian field, we are also firmly committed to work towards greater effectiveness and complementarity of efforts, and our own agencies and American agencies work well together in order to try to accomplish this.
Finally, with regard to the proposal for a report on future transatlantic relations, the House may recall that I addressed this issue perhaps a shade argumentatively in a speech to this assembly a year ago. As I said then, I do not believe that the problems we face derive from a lack of strategy. The goals and vision for our relationship, as expressed in the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, are still valid. Given the stormy waters we have traversed since then I understand the desire of some to review our course. But, it is precisely because we are still recovering from the rigours of this crossing that we should take a little time to steady ourselves and ensure that any new long-term strategy is not misdirected by the emotions and pressures of the short term. This is all the more true at a time when the European Union is engaged in a fundamental review of its own purpose and structures – including a new European Security Strategy – and the US is heading towards the early stages of a presidential election campaign.
In these circumstances there is every risk that any such review would be characterised, at least by those outside it, as further evidence of the alleged 'crisis' in European Union-United States relations. Instead we need to focus on the resolution of practical problems, whilst engaging in a more low-key dialogue with our American counterparts, preferably face-to-face rather than through the loudspeakers of our respective media. The role of the European Parliament will be essential in this regard. Of course we look to work with you to generate new ideas on the transatlantic relationship, and I hope Parliament itself will use its independence and wisdom to challenge us with some of the themes which should be included in a future strategy. We also look to the experience that you and your constituents bring to bear on the policies formulated in Brussels. Above all we need you to engage with your counterparts in Congress to ensure that the European case is given full weight in the intellectual and legislative debates in Washington.
There are just two points I would like to make in addition as a brief footnote. First of all the House has probably heard me say before that there is very little that we want to achieve in Europe which we are not more likely to achieve if we can work in cooperation with the United States. It is almost equally the case that many, if not most, of the things that the United States wants to achieve are more likely to be achievable if the United States can work with Europe. That was a point made both explicitly and implicitly in the recent American security strategy.
A partnership is different from rivalry. Equally, partners are entitled to have opinions of their own. We should not feel under any obligation to find out from Washington what our opinions as Europeans should be before we express them. So I very much hope that we will give one another, from time to time, the benefit of the doubt and will recognise that the world and we ourselves are better off if America and Europe are able to work in partnership.
One final point: I suppose it is possible to frame a view of relations for the future in terms of the solidarity that we enjoyed in the years after the Second World War, when Europe, principally, pressed for the security structures which led to the establishment of Nato and when America pressed for the economic and political integration which led to the establishment of the Common Market and eventually to the European Union.
It is folly not to recognise how much changed geostrategically with the end of the Cold War and with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. I hope that in developing a relationship for the future, we will base it on today's realities and future realities, not on the warm after-glow of a remarkably successful partnership in the second half of the last century. If we can do as well as that again we will be extremely fortunate. But if we are to do as well as that, we have to look at the problems of the future through the prism of today's challenges and not through the prism of yesterday's successes.
That we are emerging from a period of strain in the transatlantic relationship is not in dispute. In some respects it would have been a matter for greater concern if the trauma of a war had not prompted such a heartfelt debate. Nor do I doubt that some of the problems thrown into relief by the war in Iraq have deeper roots. I have spoken in this place and elsewhere of longer-term trends in some circles in the United States which are properly a cause of concern to Europeans.
Above all we must encourage political leaders and public opinion in the United States to resist those who argue in favour of overturning 50 years of American internationalism and multilateralism in pursuit of an illusory sense of security. Whatever their motivation, those in the United States who reject multilateralism must know that such an approach contains a depressing element of self-fulfilling prophecy. Multilateralism without the US may well fail. But those of us who advocate multilateralism also bear a responsibility: to ensure that it produces practical, effective and timely results.
This is an important debate. But it must not overshadow the realities of transatlantic ties which are, in many crucial respects, broadening and deepening. Having dialogue does not necessarily imply that we always agree, or that we agree on everything. But we agree to manage our differences and to continue the dialogue. We disagree on the Kyoto Protocol, but will still work together on carbon sequestration and soon on hydrogen research. We threaten the United States with FSC retaliatory measures and they take us to the WTO because they think that we are too slow in approving new genetically-modified products. But Europe and the US remain the largest trading partners in the world, and conflicts account for only a fraction of our total trade. Three quarters of all foreign direct investment in United States is European, half of America's foreign direct investment is in Europe. Europe invests more in Texas than America invests in Japan; American investments in the Netherlands are about twice the figure for American investments in Mexico.
Of course our dialogue with the United States reaches far beyond the Commission’s traditional domain of trade and economic relations. In the aftermath of September 11th 2001, we have made significant progress in police cooperation and in tackling sources of funding for terrorists. Soon we will finalise agreements on mutual legal assistance and on extradition. We are working closely with the US on a range of issues concerning transport security. And, building on the experience of EU-US cooperation in the Balkans, we are already working together on the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Now that the UN has established a political framework for Iraq in the post-Saddam period, we hope soon to be in a position to assess how we can contribute there.
Regarding the transatlantic economic partnership
a framework for a close economic relationship was agreed at the Summit in London in 1998. We have an Action Plan incorporating a range of initiatives including technical barriers to trade, procurement, mutual recognition, intellectual property and competition. In multilateral fora we have co-operated closely in efforts to drive forward the Doha Development Agenda. Bilaterally, we have progressed on mutual recognition and on the new Positive Economic Agenda agreed last year. In support of the government dialogue both Europe and United States have recently reconfirmed their commitment to the Transatlantic Business Dialogue in a more focused format.
Turning to the point on different economic models, we do not see the differences between NAFTA and the FTAA, on the one hand, and the European Union, on the other, as obstacles to a closer transatlantic economic relationship. Rather we see them as different paths towards a common destination: greater global economic integration. The regional convergence of collective preferences can be addressed in the multilateral context in a fair and constructive way, but also in bilateral terms, notably by focusing on the identification of sectoral and mutually beneficial initiatives that have a direct positive impact on business and market conditions.
Turning to the question of global challenges, for example, the environment, justice, migration, social and ethnic conflicts, clearly the report card on our co-operation is mixed. We have made a great deal of progress on justice; we have less of a meeting of minds on environmental targets.
In the realm of development assistance strategies, both Europe and the United States are committed to the new global partnership for development. We will work together in seeking to integrate developing countries into the world economy
In all these respects we are committed to the principle of complementarity
and ensuring the most efficient and effective use of donor funds in development programmes."@en1
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