Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-06-04-Speech-3-152"
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Mr President, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, ladies and gentlemen, today's debate on Mr Oostlander's report comes at an important stage in the development of our policy towards Turkey. In recent weeks and months Turkey has often been in the limelight, and the most recent international developments have once again highlighted Turkey's importance for peace and stability in a region directly bordering the European Union and which is simultaneously one of the most crisis-prone regions of the world. At the same time the advantages for the European Union of having a Muslim country standing firmly by its side are becoming ever clearer, providing living proof that it is perfectly possible for such a country to share our values. One of the great questions of the twenty-first century will be how we shape the relationship between the West and the Islamic world. Turkey has a key role to play here.
It is on the basis of the most recent changes in legislation that Leyla Zana’s retrial has been initiated. It is now extremely important that the new verdict should reflect the spirit of the democratic and constitutional reforms that Turkey has introduced in recent months. If Turkey wishes to enhance the credibility of its reform process, it must bridge the gap between the spirit of the political reforms and their practical implementation. I know that because of resistance in some camps this is not easy, but I am sure that Turkey has the strength and the ability to achieve this goal.
As regards the Cyprus question, it remains our top priority to find a comprehensive solution on the basis of the UN plan, so that a united Cyprus can join the EU on 1 May 2004. So it is now a question of maintaining the political momentum of the Cyprus process. Against this background, Turkey's support is more important than ever, for two reasons: firstly to allow the Turkish Cypriots, like their Greek Cypriot compatriots, to become fully integrated into the EU, and secondly so as to settle a question which otherwise could act as a brake on achieving Turkey's own aims once the accession negotiations start.
Yesterday, as a sign of good will and with a view to maintaining political momentum, the Commission adopted a package of measures for the Turkish Cypriot community, comprising extensive financial support for economic development and further strengthening links with the European Union, combined with measures to promote trade. In the area of trade, we are proposing to give goods from the northern part of Cyprus access to the European Union. I very much hope that all the parties involved will be able to act with sufficient flexibility to allow this to become a reality.
Turkey has only limited time left in which to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria. The Turkish Government is aware of that and I know that the Turkish Government is determined to make this goal a reality, and I am convinced that it is capable of achieving that. To this end, the Commission will continue to offer Turkey further encouragement and all the support it needs. Turkey's reformers need clear and reliable signals from us too, whereas mixed messages will hinder the acceptance of reforms in Turkish society.
I would therefore like to stress once again that the Heads of State and Government of the 15 Member States – all 15 – have in recent years repeatedly and firmly committed themselves to the fundamental principle that Turkey should become a member of the European Union. No one has said ‘no’ on principle to possible Turkish membership on strategic, geographical, cultural or religious grounds. Turkey is a candidate for accession, and it has the right to expect its application for membership to be dealt with honestly, fairly and objectively. This will be a guiding principle for the Commission in its cooperation with Turkey and in its ultimate assessment of Turkey's readiness for membership. We would all benefit from a democratic, constitutional, tolerant and internally peaceful Turkey.
The Copenhagen European Council gave Turkey a clear political road map. Turkey now has less than 18 months to implement an intensive programme of reforms before the Commission delivers an opinion on whether Turkey meets the Copenhagen political criteria. In order to support Turkey on the road to EU membership, the Commission has started to implement an enhanced pre-accession strategy.
Firstly, cooperation will be strengthened in a whole raft of areas, such as political and economic dialogue, justice and home affairs, and safety at sea. The screening of legislation will be intensified, the scope of the customs union will be extended, and trade relations will be strengthened.
Secondly, the Commission has proposed a substantial increase in financial support. It is proposing allocating resources of EUR 1.05 billion for the period 2004-2006. Part of this support is to be used to foster initiatives aimed at consolidating and developing democratic practices, constitutionality, human rights, equal rights for men and women, and the protection of minorities.
Thirdly, a revised Accession Partnership for Turkey was adopted on 14 April. Its aim is to support Turkey in meeting the accession criteria. This of course involves very close attention being paid to the political criteria. The Accession Partnership provides a framework for assessing Turkey's compliance with the political criteria, and thus for the next steps in dealing with its membership application.
We expect the Turkish Government to react to the Accession Partnership by rapidly adopting a new version of the National Programme for the Adoption of the
including a clear and timetabled legislative programme. The reforms adopted in Turkey over the last 18 months are extremely impressive. Turkey has tackled many of the as yet unsolved problems identified in the Regular Reports. It is clear that the decision taken in Helsinki to grant Turkey the status of a candidate country has acted as an effective incentive for Turkey to set a series of reforms in train. We support Turkey's firm intention to make all the remaining legislative changes required in the course of this year. This will enable Turkey to focus completely on implementation next year. We have carefully noted the announcement by Prime Minister Erdogan's government that it intends to draw up a new constitution. Furthermore, we are aware of Turkey's intention to adopt a further package of political reforms in the very new future. I am delighted to note that just in the last few days leading representatives of Turkey's armed forces have declared their full support for Turkey's European orientation and the associated reforms. We have clearly identified the remaining shortcomings in relation to these issues in the Accession Partnership. These concern the abolition of the practice of torture, the elimination of human rights limitations such as restrictions on the freedom of opinion, freedom of association and religious freedom; they also relate to problems with the political role of the military and to respect for cultural rights and compliance with rulings of the European Court of Human Rights.
As mentioned in the 2002 Regular Report, if they are to be effective these reports must also be implemented by Turkey's executive and judiciary. I would like to stress very firmly that our assessment will not only be based on what legislation has come into force, but also on compliance in practice with the Copenhagen political criteria.
When it comes to respect for human rights and basic freedoms, the picture is rather uneven. Despite the political reforms it seems that the behaviour of at least some parts of the judiciary, security forces and prison staff has not changed in practice. There are still many examples of repressive behaviour. It is evident that concerns about security and the alleged threats to secularisation and to the indivisibility of the state are continuing to play a key role in the behaviour of implementing bodies and of the judiciary. Most recently, the closure of the HADEP party and the initiation of proceedings against the DEHAP party are examples of this kind of behaviour. This is why, despite the reforms that have been adopted, it is not yet possible to make a definitive judgment. Nor do I wish to conceal my concern about certain very recent events that are not in the spirit of the reforms introduced. That featured in our debate in the last plenary."@en1
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