Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-06-04-Speech-3-011"
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"en.20030604.2.3-011"2
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".
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, as Mr Yiannitsis said, the draft Constitutional Treaty, drawn up by the European Convention, will be the focus of the forthcoming European Council in Thessaloniki. As the event is so important, my intervention today will be entirely devoted to this subject, and I am certain that the ensuing debate will provide much encouragement and many suggestions for the final, extremely delicate, stages of the Convention’s work.
We must continue to push ahead on other issues, however: firstly, the requirement for unanimity has not been repealed. I must stress this point too: this is the basic issue on which the whole future effectiveness of the Institutions depends, because the right of veto can only bring deadlock in the Union.
The best solution – there may also be second best solutions – is double simple-majority voting – that is, half the Member States and half of the population: easily comprehensible, straightforward and clear. This is the system we prefer because it reflects the dual legitimacy of the Union which – I would remind you – is based on agreement between the States and the shared will of the peoples. I repeat, the fundamental point is to eliminate the right to veto, for which we are paying an unacceptable political price, both in internal and international policies.
Secondly, the issue of a stable Presidency of the European Council is still unresolved. The solution put forward in the latest draft of the Constitution has three drawbacks: first of all, there is the fundamental problem of legitimacy, of accountability, as it is unclear to whom such a President would report, which is fundamental for democracy; in addition, it weakens your role, the European Parliament’s role, because this assembly rightly has power of control over the Commission, but not over the Council or its President. So this philosophy is asymmetrical; it is a weak kind of democracy that we are considering, that this draft is considering. We cannot accept this! Last, but certainly not least, it would create another executive within the Council which would end up generating confusion between Community competences. So no simplification of instruments here, and even less clarity about who does what within the Union.
Keeping that picture and these three basic objections in mind, we are open to various solutions, ranging from maintaining the rotating Presidency to creating a post of Chairman, purely and simply ‘Chairman’, to make the Council more efficient technically. More generally, what counts is laying the basis for effectively combining what cannot go beyond intergovernmental cooperation today and our firmly established Community mechanisms, something which does not, however, come out of the draft. This cannot be achieved by dividing and fragmenting these two dimensions, but rather by interlinking them, and providing for possible future development towards more unitary formulae, such as that of a future President of the Union.
We need to be creative, imaginative and have a sense of time and the future. Today we already have the Union’s Foreign Minister as a practical example to work with. The person holding this post will represent the Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while we want the Commission, as I just said, to continue to represent it in all other areas. This explains the proposal for a dual nature of the Foreign Minister and why he must be a Commissioner if the idea is to work, albeit a Commissioner with special status as regards the CFSP. The Foreign Minister will therefore need to work closely with the College and, in particular, with the President of the Commission and must have the backing of a genuine European service.
This structure must be linked administratively with the Commission so that it can work together with the other Commission departments in order to make optimum use of knowledge, resources and action in all sectors linked to foreign policy in the strict sense. The Union’s external representation will thus be truly unitary and able to utilise Community and intergovernmental instruments effectively, and this will give us the international influence and role we should have.
This, ladies and gentlemen, is a practical example of how the intergovernmental and Community dimensions should be combined. The events of the last few months have taught us one thing: until we put an end to our divisions, we will continue to be an economic giant and a political dwarf on the world stage; indeed, when you are a political dwarf for too long, you cease to be an economic giant.
Before closing, I want to raise one last point: we need the right institutional instruments to strengthen our economic policies, precisely to prevent us being sidelined on the economy too. In this context, one can legitimately wonder whether one option for a workable combination of today’s intergovernmental and Community mechanisms would not be for the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs to chair the Eurogroup and represent the euro area externally in international institutions. This calls for a strong person, someone who will continuously represent the Union.
Ladies and gentlemen, that sums up what I wanted to say today. There are many things I could add, but I have sought to confine myself to the essential points so that there is more time for debate. I would just like to say a few, final words to thank the Greek Presidency. They have shown determination, effectiveness, understanding and sensitivity to the various points of view – a model of how we should work together. This leads me to make a further remark – which may seem ill-disposed but which on the contrary is sincere, indeed absolutely sincere – that is, that institutional engineering formulae may provide a rational explanation why the rotation system cannot function. I repeat: perhaps they can explain it, but no formula can replace the enthusiasm and intelligence of policy-makers who put their national cultural heritage at the service of Europe’s common interest.
Firstly, with just a few days to go before the Convention closes, I would like to thank all those who have represented this assembly at the Convention. Your commitment has been, and will be decisive for the future of this delicate process. I would also like to thank President Simitis and Mr Yiannitsis, as well as their team, for their patient mediation work which will culminate at Thessaloniki and I hope the results will be positive.
It was not so long ago that the Commission and Parliament strongly propounded a Convention on the future of Europe. Today we have the opportunity to establish our first true Constitution from a democratic debate taking place in the full light of day. Together, ladies and gentlemen, we sought the Convention and together we must strive for its success.
The Convention must put forward a balanced text with no alternatives, a text that lays the foundations for Europe for many years to come, guaranteeing our presence and independence on the international stage. If we did not achieve this, the risks would be enormous. If we leave the decisions on a number of crucial issues to the intergovernmental conference, we risk a rerun of the sorry experience of Nice. That would be an ironic turn of fate because we wanted the Convention precisely because we were not satisfied with Nice.
Let me remind you of the original ideas behind this great reform of our policies and our Institutions. In December 2001, the Laeken Declaration established the Convention and gave it the task of preparing the ground for the Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as possible. The Laeken Declaration sets three main objectives: firstly, a better division and definition of European Union competences; secondly, simplification of our legal instruments and action; thirdly, making the Union more democratic, transparent and efficient. The basic aim is to assert the values pursued by the Union, define citizens’ fundamental rights and duties and clarify the relationship between Member States within the Union.
The Convention, therefore, came into being with a Herculean task, an extremely difficult task ahead of it. Nevertheless, we must also admit that in almost half a century we have built up an astonishing wealth of institutional and lawmaking experience and we have developed a style of politics that is unique on the world scene and of which we should be proud.
So the Convention’s brief is clear: it must define more clearly who does what in the European Union. This means striking a new balance between the Institutions so that Europe can play its part in a globalised world, but a balance that is easy to grasp for our citizens. Parliament and the Council must have joint legislative power, requiring the general extension of codecision; the Court of Justice must hold
judicial power, and in this respect I am in favour of extending its jurisdiction to foreign policy and to the area of justice and home affairs; lastly, in addition to clarification of its legislative power, the Union needs a single executive: the Commission. Under the control of the European Parliament and the Council, the Commission should apply legislation, implement policies and represent the Union externally, except in matters relating to the Common Security and Defence Policy. Duplicating the executive would not provide European citizens with the necessary transparency and accountability, and the executive would escape your control, Parliament’s control.
There is one point, however, that I must stress as being of prime importance: the general application of majority voting as a decisive and determining element of the political will to act with democracy and efficiency. Without this we will lack democracy and efficiency.
The latest version of the draft Constitutional Treaty, published by the Convention, contains some, perhaps many, good proposals: the Charter of Fundamental Rights is firmly enshrined as Part Two of our Constitution; the scope of the codecision process has been extended, although not far enough; lastly, it is now clear that we will have a Foreign Minister to represent the Union at international level."@en1
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