Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-06-03-Speech-2-055"
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"en.20030603.2.2-055"2
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". Mr President, in this debate the Commission acted like an
because it was not the negotiator, it assisted the successive Council presidencies in their negotiations. Therefore, I will just try to clarify some of the points raised and give the Commission's opinion on those points.
I shall begin with Article 13. I shall try to make myself clear. The US-EU agreement is a bilateral agreement that regulates the relationship between the European Union and the United States of America. It does not regulate the relationship between the Member States of the European Union among themselves or the obligations that Member States have under other international legal instruments. All the Member States have subscribed to the European Convention on Human Rights and to the specific protocol that forbids the death penalty. This means that, acting in accordance with their international obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, Member States will refuse extradition where the death penalty is concerned.
That does not derive from an obligation between the European Union and the United States of America. It derives directly from the obligation of the Member States to be in line with the European Convention on Human Rights, with the protocol and, I hope, with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that will have constitutional status and be legally binding after its inclusion in the new Constitutional Treaty.
When it comes to the International Criminal Court, I would draw your attention to the fact that Article 10 of the agreement does not apply to the International Criminal Court because that court is not a state and Article 10 only regulates the criteria to be used when there is simultaneously, in regard to a same person, a conflicting request by a third state – like the United States of America – and by a European Union Member State. It does not deal with requests from the International Criminal Court. Therefore, nothing prevents the Member States from deciding what they want to do as far as a request from the International Criminal Court is concerned, irrespective of any bilateral agreement with the United States of America.
When it comes to the European arrest warrant as such, I can even agree with Parliament. However, unfortunately, the Council did not adopt the Commission's proposal on the primacy of the European arrest warrant. Therein lies the problem. We are not talking today about a fully comprehensive primacy of the European arrest warrant over any other request for extradition. It does not exist. The framework decision on the European arrest warrant already recognises that when there is a demand under a European arrest warrant and a simultaneous demand for extradition by a third country, there are a number of criteria that will have to be taken into consideration in order to decide which demand has primacy. So we are not changing the legal system of the European Union. The Commission regrets that this primacy was not recognised in the past when the Council adopted the European arrest warrant. However, today this primacy does not exist and therefore cannot be affected by the terms of a bilateral agreement with the United States.
What we were careful to say was that the possibility of recognising in the future the primacy of the European arrest warrant could not be undermined or limited by this kind of bilateral agreement. There is a specific provision on the revision of this kind of bilateral agreement with the United States in case we decide to recognise the primacy of the European arrest warrant in the future. I hope that sooner or later we will do that.
Finally, on the matter of special courts. It must be said that the key issue for me – and I have always said this to Parliament – is not the nature of the court, it is not the question of special courts as such – even some Member States have special courts in the European Union. The question is one of due and fair process and guarantees, so that extradition is only granted where there are guarantees that the requesting Member State will follow a due and fair process. There are two recitals in the agreements that address this issue. The first one concerns due regard for the rights of individuals and the rule of law; the second one concerns the guarantees and the respective legal systems which provide for the right to a fair trial of an extradited person.
Above all, there is Article 16a on non-derogation, which in paragraph 1 maintains all grounds for refusal relating to a matter not governed by this agreement available under a bilateral extradition treaty in force and which in paragraph 2 calls for consultation where the constitutional principles of the requested state may pose impediments to the fulfilment of its obligation to extradite. In my interpretation, everything that might be considered as a demand for extradition to a court where the rule of due process is not respected can give leverage to the application of this Article 16a on non-derogation.
Finally, I sincerely hope that in the future Constitution we will have specific provisions not only on consultation of Parliament concerning these kinds of agreements, which will become more frequent in the future, but also concerning the competence of the European Court of Justice to guarantee the full compliance of these agreements with the future Constitution of the European Union."@en1
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