Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-03-11-Speech-2-154"
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"en.20030311.7.2-154"2
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"Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, we knew that this matter would arise. For a long time, it was too early to discuss it. This was true, in particular, when, by means of a report presented in autumn 2000, we tried to discuss it within the context of our work on enlargement. The report was by Mr Brok. Today, it would be hasty to take a decision solely on the basis of the work of the European Central Bank. The truth is that, in fact, the institutional solutions we adopt with regard to the Central Bank are sometimes frightening, because we sometimes have the impression that they could be imposed on other institutional mechanisms, or even the Union itself. That is the reality of the debate we are holding here.
Essentially, I believe that the Convention can undo what the Treaty of Nice has done. The Convention must be able to reverse proposals from the Central Bank because what is basically proposed is a change to the system, whether this involves the establishment of a rotation mechanism or differentiation between the decisions taken within the Central Bank. Essentially, once again, I believe that we cannot reject the entire proposal made by the Central Bank, for example the idea of restricting the number of members of the Governing Council if we want this body to be able to continue to take decisions. Essentially, I also believe that we should examine these proposals and try to extract what we consider to be the main points.
I believe we can extract some information, some criteria, from the experience gained by the Central Bank in its short life. The first criterion is that the distribution of power between the Executive Board and the Governing Council must be examined carefully to ensure that the Bank is in a position to take decisions. The second criterion, which the Chairman of our committee, Mrs Christa Randzio-Plath, has mentioned, concerns the transparency of decisions within decision-making bodies. The third criterion concerns the Bank’s ability to define monetary policy in the interests of the whole euro zone.
I believe we should examine the Central Bank’s proposal in light of these three criteria, and, in particular, it is in light of these three criteria that the Convention – because I think this decision is principally the responsibility of the Convention – will have to propose a solution for the future of decision-making within the Central Bank."@en1
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