Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-03-11-Speech-2-151"
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"en.20030311.7.2-151"2
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"Mr President, Commissioner, the European Union, or at least some representatives of countries that are allegedly more important than the others, is suffering from a mystery illness, Gulliver’s syndrome.
Whether within the Convention or in bodies such as the European Central Bank, representatives of the large countries believe they are under threat of being tied up by a gang of small countries, which are by definition irresponsible and which, following enlargement, will form the majority within the Council in terms of numbers. Although it is true that the European Union theoretically brings together States that are equal in rights and duties, some, like George Orwell’s pigs, believe themselves to be more equal than others.
The history of the European Union does not provide a single example of an alliance of Lilliputians against the Gullivers of Europe. In fact, every case of obstruction in Europe, from de Gaulle’s empty chair policy to Maggie Thatcher’s famous ‘I want my money back’, has been the work of the large countries.
The Stability and Growth Pact was invented to establish budgetary discipline in the so-called ‘Club Med’ countries in order to guarantee the external value of the euro. The Pact is respected by the small countries, but far less by the large countries. Gulliver’s syndrome, however, leads some capital cities to believe that governors from small countries might be led to impose a lax monetary policy. The result of all these fears is the ECB proposal to restrict the number of governors deciding on monetary policy.
President Duisenberg claims that governors do not vote according to their national interests, that there are, in fact, no votes and that monetary policy is decided by consensus. Why, therefore, this proposal to change the voting system? We are told that it will no longer be possible to vote when there are 25 Members. Although a discussion between 25 Members would certainly be longer, a vote for or against a change to key interest rates can take place just as easily with 25 as with 18 or 9 governors.
This is not, therefore, the real reason behind the proposed reform. In fact, the five large States, which represent approximately three quarters of the Community GDP, want to be able to define monetary policy themselves. In this regard, the ECB’s proposal is ingenious, since it would set up a system of rotation between three groups of countries which would ensure that the large countries are able to vote in 80% of cases.
The Friedrich report proposes to restrict monetary policy decisions to an Executive Board of nine Members, which would be selected on the basis of the two-fold criteria of the population of each country and the total size of its economy and the relative size within it of the financial services sector. As regards this latter point, the Friedrich report is in line with the unanimous proposal of the Governing Council. However, there are still some doubts in relation to all these proposals. As this is not a matter of urgency, why not grant us an additional reflection period?
Mr President, I would also like to respond to Mr Della Vedova that, according to the ECB proposals, Poland would still be ahead of Luxembourg."@en1
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