Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-03-11-Speech-2-147"
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"en.20030311.7.2-147"2
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"Mr President, I agree with the rapporteur: the proposal submitted for reform of the voting in the ECB Governing Council is not a step in the right direction. It is because it was developed from the perspective of national representation, not a European perspective, that it must be rejected. What we actually need is an ambitious European solution. Here, no Member of this House can be neutral, for the way in which such a key macroeconomic partner arrives at its decisions is important. We must therefore know how the decisions are shaped, but there is still time for that at the next Intergovernmental Conference.
Specifying that representation should be on a national basis conflicts with the aim of an integrated monetary policy. However, I should point out here that when drafting its proposal, the European Central Bank's hands were tied, for the paltry spirit of the Treaty of Nice is also reflected in the enabling clause contained in Article 10.2, and we therefore do indeed need a proposal from the Convention for the Intergovernmental Conference so that a number of issues become clear: should the Executive Board have a special role? Should we differentiate between monetary policy and operational decisions? Where should the strategic decisions be taken? This is possible with a unanimous amendment to the Treaty.
I really do think it is important for us to make this distinction, simply because it is necessary. As the European Parliament, we also have a particular interest in doing so because we attach importance to transparency. Like our colleagues in the USA, we want to be able to follow how decisions are taken and also how weightings occur in the discussions. In this respect, the difficult proposal by the ECB, which we in the Socialist Group cannot endorse, sends out quite a hopeful signal – for up to now, we have always been told that the outcomes of the votes in the ECB's Governing Council could not be published because no votes take place. I think that in a democratic system, majority voting should apply, and then the voting behaviour of the individual members of the central banks or the Executive Board can also be published.
I am all in favour of anonymity, so that no names are mentioned, as in the USA. Our key concern is to gain an overview of the various perspectives on monetary policy. This will remove confusion and insecurity, create the clarity that is required, especially at present, and underline the Central Bank's democratic duty of accountability."@en1
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