Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2003-03-11-Speech-2-145"
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"en.20030311.7.2-145"2
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".
Mr President, in this my first intervention I should like to say a few words about the Commission’s ruling. I shall outline our differences with Mr Friedrich’s report and refer also to our final position.
Any reform of the Central Bank must comply with four conditions. Firstly, decisions have to be taken quickly and efficiently. Secondly, decision-making bodies have to act taking account of the interests of the Eurozone as a whole. Thirdly, the system has to be impartial and fair to present and future Members. Fourthly, the markets and the public as a whole have to be aware of transparency. This is crucial to understanding the operation of the system.
The model advocated by the Central Bank does help to ensure efficiency. Nonetheless, the key feature of the Central Bank’s proposal is based on the enabling clause in the Treaty of Nice. It is therefore based on the premise that the system legally in force may not be modified. I should like to return to this when I have heard what Mr Friedrich has to say. The Commission is of the opinion that taking the European Central Bank’s proposal as a point of departure, the rotation model may be improved by reducing the maximum number of voting rights on the Governing Council. Such improvement should be substantial. It should involve adjusting the method of classifying countries into groups. There is no need to develop new types of weighting. The Bank’s own classification should be used instead. This takes account on the one hand of population and, on the other, of GDP. Improvements are called for, however, to clarify the frequency and order of rotation in this type of voting. This is the thinking behind our proposals.
Having considered the proposals in the report, we believe them to be ambitious, but find they pose a fundamental problem. They envisage interpretations going beyond the enabling clause. We differ on this in two respects. Turning to the most significant first, the report rejects the Central Bank’s model and presents a counter-proposal. The latter is no doubt technically valid, but it is not in line with the enabling clause. The notion of a double key, involving double weighting of the vote, is not in line with the clause either. This is because according to legislation currently in force, every Member of the Council must have a voting right. Such adjustments are therefore better suited to a different context, to a more ambitious position, like the one you yourself referred to, Mr Friedrich.
The decision we have to take in the near future is whether or not to go ahead, following the accelerated procedure, and adopt the Central Bank’s proposal. A decision must be made within the next few weeks if it is to comply with the enabling clause. Were this to be the case, a unanimous vote in the Council of Ministers would be required. As you are aware, this is still outstanding. Nonetheless, the Commission agrees with the House that a more thorough reform is called for. Such reform should go further than what is envisaged under the enabling clause. We should be prepared to tackle it at the next Intergovernmental Conference on the basis of a different model. As has been rightly pointed out, this can be done at the Intergovernmental Conference, but not under the current enabling clause."@en1
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