Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-07-03-Speech-3-097"
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"en.20020703.3.3-097"2
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The Scheele report endorses a highly exceptionable centralised European system for the authorisation of GMOs, as proposed in communication COM(2001)425 final from the Commission. This proposal, in fact, refers obscurely to Decision 1999468/EC laying down procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission, according to which:
1. authorisation decisions are taken by the Commission, subject to the delivery of a favourable opinion by a ‘regulatory committee’, composed of representatives of the Member States, which acts by a qualified majority;
2. if the regulatory committee does not approve the Commission’s proposal, the matter is referred to the Council itself; if, however, the proposal is neither adopted by a qualified majority of the Council nor unanimously rejected by the Council, adoption of the proposal becomes the sole prerogative of the Commission.
In this way, the use of a GMO may be authorised against the will of a minority of Member States and even, in particular cases, against the will of the majority. There is no provision for a national safeguard clause at this level – even if, for example, a nation were to vote against the use of a GMO in a referendum.
This procedure is plainly designed to give the Commission a free hand to issue authorisations, leaving governments to explain that it is a European rule about which they can do nothing. This is how democracy works in Brussels."@en1
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