Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-12-11-Speech-2-216"

Predicate	Value (sorted: default)
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech2
dcterms:Date	"2001-12-11"^^xsd:date2
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:Question Time (Commission)2
dcterms:Language	"fr"^^xsd:language2
lpv:document identification number	"en.20011211.10.2-216"2
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:2001-12-11-Speech-2-2172
lpv:speaker	lp:Lamy2
lpv:translated text	". Mr Purvis, I can see what you are driving at and I am not sure that I can go as far as you want to take me in this direction. One of the reasons why Doha was better than Seattle – and, in my view, this is the main reason – was because everyone (the governments, the WTO, the NGOs) gave much thought as to why Seattle failed. Everyone learnt a great deal from this failure after the event, if I may say so, and took lessons from it in preparation for Doha. The reason why Doha was a success was, in the main, related to preparation. The reason why Seattle was a failure was, in the main, related to preparation. The preparations for Seattle were poor, the preparations for Doha were good, and that is what counts for around 80% of the success. That basically leaves 20%. In Doha, things were well managed and the number of parties, in other words, the number of people who felt involved in the negotiations, who felt able to influence them, was considerable. I always thought that what happened in the streets of Seattle only had a very small bearing on what was obviously a failure. Similarly, I believe that what did not take place in the streets of Doha only had a very small bearing on the success of Doha."@en1

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