Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-11-14-Speech-3-203"

Predicate	Value (sorted: default)
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech2
dcterms:Date	"2001-11-14"^^xsd:date2
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:Negotiations within the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention following the recent anthrax attacks2
dcterms:Language	"nl"^^xsd:language2
lpv:document identification number	"en.20011114.9.3-203"2
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:2001-11-14-Speech-3-2042
lpv:speaker	lp:Jan Marinus Wiersma2
lpv:spokenAs	substitute; Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism (1999-07-22--2002-01-14)3 chair; Delegations to the parliamentary cooperation committees and delegations for relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (1999-07-22--2002-01-14)3 member; PES (1999-07-20--2004-07-19)3 member; PETI (1999-09-16--2002-01-14)3 member; Conference of Delegation Chairs (1999-07-22--2002-01-14)3 member; Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (1999-07-21--2002-01-14)3 unknown; Partij van de Arbeid (1999-07-20--2004-07-19)3
lpv:translated text	"Mr President, earlier this year we expressed our disappointment at the lack of support from the United States for the reinforcement of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In the wake of the events of 11 September and the anthrax attacks on the United States, the issue of bio-terror has suddenly become very topical. Biological weapons are threatening to become part of the asymmetrical warfare which typifies the fight against terrorism. The Convention is, of course, directed at states, but the effective implementation also makes it more difficult for terrorists to obtain these weapons. These weapons have been banned for a very long time, but are unfortunately still available. That is why we call for binding international rules in order to monitor compliance with the Convention better. Fortunately, the Americans are back at the negotiating table. They have a problem which they are unable to solve on their own. However, the proposals they have tabled contain too many loopholes. The tighter and more transparent the controls, the better, and that must also be the EU’s focus of attention at the forthcoming review conference later this month. The Convention must become an instrument in the search of manufacturers of biological weapons, but also for tracking down existing supplies. Russia used to implement extensive programmes. How were they wound up, and what happened with the expertise gathered? It is rumoured that scientists who worked on these programmes have offered their services elsewhere. The anthrax attacks in the US compel us yet again to consider how we can stop the arms programmes in Iraq. For this purpose, the UN must launch new initiatives. Naturally, the Convention does not offer adequate protection against bio-terror, against the so-called non-governmental players. This also requires more and better cooperation with the police and intelligence services, as well as better criminal investigation methods. We need to offer our citizens better protection against possible attacks and the effects thereof. Many countries take measures in order to protect themselves against anthrax or smallpox better. The costs involved in those initiatives are enormous. Poor countries do not have those funds and could for that reason become the principal victim of a possible smallpox epidemic as a result of bio-terror. I would call on the EU and the EU Member States not only to consider the possible protection of its own citizens, but also to examine whether developing countries can be helped by setting up programmes to protect the people in the event of possible terrorist attacks involving biological weapons."@en1

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