Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-11-13-Speech-2-096"

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"en.20011113.7.2-096"2
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". The risk of manufacturing and circulating false euro notes and coins is a serious threat overshadowing the launch of the single currency, which will be present for several years following the physical changeover to notes and coins taking place on 1 January 2002. During this critical period, the confidence of our citizens is a vital factor. It appears, however, that the danger was under-estimated, and then it was too late to deal with it. The Commission only published its main communication on the subject on 22 July 1998, and it was in 1999 and 2000 that the first, but still incomplete, provisions were adopted on extending Europol’s mandate and the criminal penalties against counterfeiting of the euro. The draft decision that we are examining today adds to these measures by establishing a Community training and assistance programme by the key players involved in combating counterfeiting. Although there have been no major objections to the text itself, we can only stress, however, that it has arrived too late and that it contains some ambiguities, which arise from the design faults in the single currency. First of all, the text before us constantly wavers between providing ‘training’, and ‘assistance’, and does not dare to state too clearly that, 48 days before the physical changeover to using coins and notes, cooperation in this vital area has still not been finalised. Secondly, one of the objectives of the training and assistance programme is to protect the euro outside the euro zone, which is not actually an area of the Community competence. From this particular perspective, we can see how shaky the single currency system is, one that is shared between Community competences and other competences that remain national, and both sides are poor at organising coordination. But how could things be any different, as at Maastricht, the aim was to seduce the electorate into believing that the single currency was possible without having an absolute super State?"@en1

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