Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-10-24-Speech-3-155"

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". Mr President, Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, the transition from the GATT era to that of the WTO changed the dimension as well as the nature of the multilateral trading system. With the advent of the WTO, trade rules were extended to a large number of new areas, including services, intellectual property, investment and rules on non-tariff barriers, that frequently affect non-trade issues. These rules have a binding force, which is backed by a dispute settlement system with the capacity to impose sanctions. Finally, enlargement, which begun under GATT, has resulted in an unprecedented diversity among its members with regard to international trade. The rules of the multilateral trading system now apply not only to the countries that account for most of world trade or only to the one-fifth of world production that is traded across borders. They also apply to goods and services that will never be traded internationally. All countries are concerned and their internal rules affected, whatever their share of international trade. Fourthly, there is the balance between international standards and establishing new relationships between the WTO and other international organisations. We propose that all other multilateral organisations, such as the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organisation, etc., be given observer status within the WTO and that their opinion be systematically sought by the dispute settlement body when there is a risk of conflict between trade rules and other rules. In our view, the European Union should propose a de facto hierarchy of standards at international level, with which all countries must comply. In other words, it should recognise that business law or trade law cannot supplant the principles of environmental protection, public health and respect for the social rights of workers. It must fall to the ILO, and the ILO alone, to decide whether or not it is appropriate to adopt retaliatory measures and to impose trade sanctions on countries, and not the World Trade Organisation. I feel, however, that the WTO must give a commitment to respect any decisions that the ILO may take on such matters. To conclude briefly, Mr President, I would say that trade policy, which is one of the oldest of the EU’s policies and its oldest external common policy concerns, of course, economic interests, but it also says a great deal – or, in any event, the European Union says a great deal – by means of this trade policy, about its vision of the world and of north-south relations in particular. It also reveals a belief in a division between that which is the domain of the market and that which societies must do in the name of principles, such as, solidarity. This policy must reflect the Union's fundamental values and objectives. For this reason, the EU’s priorities must be the establishment of fair and equitable trade, a democratic multilateral system, and a reformed WTO. In recent years, trade agreements have also had a growing impact on other international rules in areas such as the environment, health and social rights. Thus, WTO agreements or decisions have threatened the precautionary principle, environmental protection and access to medicines. The cause of this is partly the ambiguity of some agreements, such as the agreement on intellectual property, in the case of medicines, but with regard to public services, the scope of Article 1 of the General Agreement on Services is also to blame. To this, we can add another reason for the undermining of the multilateral trade system: the democratic legitimacy of the WTO, an intergovernmental organisation, in principle, relies firstly on the equal participation of all members, on the fact that they have an equal say in the organisation. Most of the developing countries, however, feel marginalised by its operation and cut off from the decision making process. At least 24 developing countries that are members of the WTO have no permanent representation in Geneva, and numerous others have only very small delegations that do not allow them to follow all of the proceedings that concern them. Many developing countries lack the necessary competences. In such situations, form and content are real issues for developing countries because the rules and agreements more often reflect the interests of the trading powers that have negotiated them between themselves, sometimes in ‘green rooms’ or in informal meetings, which are far too secretive – than the interests of all members, particularly of the poorest countries. Consequently, since the Uruguay Round, many developing countries have stated that they were not aware, when they signed, of all the legal, administrative and financial consequences of agreements such as the TRIPS agreement on intellectual property, which were drawn up without their involvement. Generally, where the developing countries are concerned, six years on from the creation of the WTO, the picture before us reveals a limited opening up of markets in the north, considerable difficulties in implementing agreements and persistent marginalisation from the workings of the WTO. This feeling is more acute still for the least developed countries (LDCs), which, twenty years ago, accounted for 0.6% of international trade. Today the figure stands at only 0.4%. The WTO, therefore, continues to be dominated by the large trading powers, and it is they that benefit overwhelmingly from its policies. And, two years after Seattle, the multilateral trade system is still undergoing a threefold crisis of democratic legitimacy, as a consequence of the uneven distribution of the benefits of world trade, of the marginalisation of many of its members, as a result of the impact of some WTO rules on other basic principles, even at international level, and lastly due to a lack of transparency and the limited involvement of parliaments and civil society in the work of the WTO. Although the WTO has started to acknowledge the need for reform, this recognition has yet to be translated into the necessary changes. As you know, Commissioner, our committee, therefore, adopted, by a large majority – 48 votes to 5, with 1 abstention – a report which is noteworthy above all for its set of practical proposals, grouped into four main chapters. First of all, the equal and effective participation of all members is a key factor in any new direction for the multilateral trading system. This will require an increase in the provision of technical assistance. The Commission has already undertaken a number of actions and we urge it to persevere in this direction. We propose going further, however. The Commission should propose the creation, for example, on the basis of a contribution proportional to each member’s share of international trade, of a fund or an increase in the WTO’s budget, which would enable all member countries to have a representation in Geneva. We propose supporting regional representations, which is already being done, specifically for the ACP countries, but we feel that we need to go further; we need to establish internal transparency; until all members have a representation, we must allow non-resident countries to have rapid access to records of meetings and draft agreements; we must establish clear rules on so-called ‘informal’ consultations to allow all countries that wish to take part to do so, by publishing agendas in advance and by ensuring that reports of prior decisions, which are sometimes prepared, are provided to the competent bodies in good time. We also propose that the dispute settlement system be reformed, because there are still inequalities linked to the market share of the various member countries, to ensure that the small countries, those that account for a small proportion of international trade, can, in certain circumstances, seek financial compensation. Secondly, there is the issue of opening the WTO up to society and external transparency. We feel that much remains to be done in this area before we reach the level of other organisations, within which observer status has been given to non-governmental organisations. We feel that the dispute settlement procedure itself could, given the judicial nature of the procedures, be held in public, as is the case in court proceedings. Thirdly, there is the issue of parliamentary control, which was mentioned in the previous debate, at both national and European level and also by means of a consultative parliamentary assembly within the WTO. Where the European Union is concerned, we propose that Article 133 of the EC Treaty be reformed, that the 133 committee be opened up to Parliament's representatives, and that the European Parliament’s assent be required for all trade agreements."@en1

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