Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-10-03-Speech-3-205"

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"Mr President, I should like to thank all those who took part in the debate for their comments and contributions. On occasion, the Commission has insisted that the cyclically adjusted deficit position should be included in information on the stability programmes. You are well aware, ladies and gentlemen, that we are experiencing technical difficulties. The latter relate not only to the concept but also to the method of calculating this structurally adjusted position. Obviously, rather than making us more flexible, this will allow us to apply the pact to a reality different from that which prevailed when the various stability programmes were defined. It further implies as I said in my first speech, that in the Commission’s interpretation nominal objectives must not be considered set in stone. The nominal objectives are linked to certain assumptions on growth. Consequently, as I stated, there are no problems, there is flexibility and no dogmatism. Rather, we have moved on to a different stage as far as implementation of the Growth and Stability Pact is concerned. Would an approach involving greater spending resolve the problems? I do not believe it would. Our position is that given the European experience in recent years, involving a rather procyclical approach to this type of decision, and having observed the difficulty experienced in regaining balance, it is not a wise option. As I said in my opening speech, we therefore remain of the opinion that the best choice is to opt for more Europe. Some of you have argued along the same lines. More Europe means Lisbon. In the context of Lisbon, more Europe means increasing our potential growth. More Europe means more efficient systems. More Europe also means taking greater account of the impact of the crisis on the international markets. It also means taking into account factors as significant as international commercial negotiations on development aid, and all those related factors which will doubtless allow us to improve the context. In conclusion, more Europe can also mean progress on issues linked to fiscal competence which some of you have referred to, ladies and gentlemen. There is no doubt about that. More Europe will certainly mean progress in the fight against money laundering. All this is undoubtedly essential if we are to cope successfully with the tasks we have set ourselves. A debate such as today’s warranted a much longer reply. Unfortunately however, we are running out of time. Nonetheless, I was anxious to comment quickly on these ideas to make the Commission’s position on this final item quite clear. I shall start by pointing out that our economic situation is different from that of the United States. The European Union’s point of departure is quite other from the United States’: our balances are not the same either, what has taken place in the United States has not taken place in Europe and, furthermore, our institutional framework is not the same. In my view it would be unrealistic and undesirable to try to apply the American model to Europe. It has emerged from the debate that some of you feel our main concern is to prevent public sector involvement. That is not at all the case. We have never conceived of this issue in terms of a public sector versus private sector debate. There is scope for more public investment. There can be more public involvement, always of course within the rules laid down in the system we have created for ourselves to ensure more effective operation of the balance between monetary and fiscal policy. The ECOFIN decision on airlines and insurance cover as a result of the political risks involved is a good example of the swift effect of public action. The debate then moved on to focus on the Growth and Stability Pact. Some of you are of the opinion that those of us in favour of the pact are adopting a fundamentalist position, others find it dogmatic. Some of you have even mooted the possibility of doing away with the pact altogether. I would be inclined to side with the presidency and with those of you who have referred to something I consider crucial. The Growth and Stability Pact is intended to serve as an instrument to facilitate anticyclical action by the public finances. That was its original aim and remains its essential nature. Hence there is no question of dogmatism or fundamentalism. We could discuss whether our past experience, gained from implementing the pact during periods of growth, has led us to the conclusion that it is only applicable to that end. True, in times of growth we were not particularly dogmatic as far as exhausting the possibilities of the pact with regard to reducing the public deficit in certain Member States. We may well be regretting that just now. Returning to the logic enshrined in the pact, the pact does allow anticyclical actions. There is no doubt that the pact’s flexibility is due to two fundamental elements. The first concerns exceptional circumstances and it is not relevant to analyse these now, as exceptional circumstances are only invoked in times of deep recession or when growth has fallen below certain levels. The second element concerns the normal implementation of the pact through the operation of the automatic stabilisers. In the specific case of the automatic stabilisers, the element of flexibility is contained in the pact itself. I can state quite clearly that in no way are we amending any position. Rather, the nature of the pact provides accordingly. In the code of conduct adopted by ECOFIN last July it was already stated that one of the fundamental elements of the Growth and Stability Pact is the medium-term objective for the fiscal position. It is made quite clear that assessment of the objective for the various countries should take explicit account of the cyclical position and its implications for the budget. Clearly, as some of you have pointed out, this element will therefore have to be taken into account when adjusting Member States’ stability programmes."@en1

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