Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-09-03-Speech-1-070"
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"en.20010903.6.1-070"2
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".
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr Mayer pointed out that the idea of creating a European limited liability company was already being discussed more than 30 years ago. The former President of the European Commission and Member of this Parliament, Mr Santer, made this form of company a more prominent subject for discussion in the second half of the 1990s. Mr Santer and a number of his fellow campaigners here in Parliament wanted it as a way of attracting global players from Europe to compete in world markets.
The European limited liability company has hitherto foundered in the Council of Ministers especially because of the issues surrounding the position of workers. In 1970, a regulation on the European limited liability company one-sidedly stipulated just the German model of co-decision-making, although co-decision-making is simply not an item for export.
In the late 1980s, Parliament was presented with two documents which were intrinsically linked. Dr. Mayer has already outlined these: a regulation on issues of company law – the statute – and the directive concerning the position of workers in the limited liability company or SE. Three models were established, of which one had to be chosen. Even in this matter, there was no general consensus. It was only in 1997 that a solution emerged in the form of a proposal from Parliament. This proposal was underpinned academically by the work of a group of experts under the chairmanship of Etienne Davignon, and the Davignon Report was signed by trade union members and members of employer associations. Whichever way you look at it, this was a breakthrough because it fell back on the recipe for success established by the Directive on the European works council, a subject which we shall touch upon again in the next item on the agenda.
The following basic principles for the creation of a European limited liability company were now proposed: flexibility, negotiated solutions and minimum standards. Thus, the customs of employee participation existing within the European Union were also skilfully incorporated. In other words, in some countries participation is established through legal channels and in others by means of collective agreements. Now these are combined: as regards the European limited liability company, a special made-to-measure collective agreement is drawn up between the founding board of directors and a special negotiating body of employees and, in the absence of an agreement, the minimum laws governing worker involvement shall be applicable for half a year to a year. The Davignon Report calls these reference rules. The EWC Directive talks of subsidiary requirements. I think this is the better term as it refers to subsidiarity in an exemplary manner. This idea was also decided upon in Nice. We support the regulations governing participation agreed in Nice.
The report from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs proposes two significant amendments to the Council’s draft. Firstly, we would like a different definition of the term participation from that used by the Council. The designated body representing workers is nothing more than a special European works council for the European limited liability company, incidentally with better legal powers, something which we should remember when amending the Works Council Directive. However, there are, and remain, laws governing information and consultation. It would be wrong to use the term ‘participation’ here.
Secondly, the original Commission proposal made it clear that the procedure for electing employees onto the supervisory or management board is to be governed according to the provisions applicable in each Member State. In Germany, therefore, employee members must be directly or indirectly elected in accordance with the election of members to supervisory boards pursuant to the German law on stock companies. I am convinced that, in this regard, it is essential not to make a distinction in the electoral process. Under German law on stock companies, members are elected. Under the arrangements governing the European limited liability company, employee representatives will not be elected.
The regulation and directive in question have retrieved the European limited liability company from the frozen depths of European legislation. However, both – and here I agree with Mr Mayer – exhibit major shortcomings. We must finally take the first step, however. After six years, these two legal instruments should be tested and, if necessary, improved. We must get a foot in the door. The next gust of wind will open that door. I think that, with this European model, we are on the right track, including where the social dimension of the internal market is concerned. The European model is, of course, not purely a matter of market economics and, therefore, not purely a limited liability company either. Rather, it is a limited liability company also involving the participation specifically of the employees."@en1
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