Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-07-03-Speech-2-121"
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"en.20010703.7.2-121"2
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"Mr President, the directive drawn up by the Commission contains an obvious bias. It is concerned with using market valuation to encourage supplementary pensions. Although the report by Mr Karas corrects this bias in places, it also makes it worse in others. We are faced with a reference model which is primarily that of the industry of supplementary pensions in place in Great Britain and other countries. Yet, in some countries, these organisations do not or only occasionally enter the financial market; in other countries workers are given cast iron guarantees, but the directive obviously does not aim to do this. In particular, it is not concerned with the coherence of national pension systems based on the principles of solidarity, security and universality.
That is why we tabled amendments on two aspects. The first, on the one hand, relates to guarantees for the people concerned, and the second, on the other hand, to public supervision and prudential actions. We believe that this text is unacceptable unless it is subject to considerable amendment.
First of all, we must improve the guarantees given to the people. The directive includes risks of discrimination and lapses in solidarity. Membership of a supplementary scheme is not compulsory, which explains the considerable inequalities. There is no provision for inter-sectoral mutualisations. The quality of benefits will suffer if the population falls. Continuity of membership cannot be guaranteed if mobile workers change jobs or sector. The definition of rights does not mandatorily include biometric risks. The guarantees of actual benefits are not organised. And we are aware of the risks taken by those who join fixed contribution schemes, pointed out, moreover, by many well-respected macro economists.
We are proposing amendments on all these points, as well as on the second issue giving us cause for concern which is the need to improve social and prudential supervision. The Commission is offering insurers the choice of opting for occupational pension schemes. The Karas report strengthens this provision by casting aside government authorisation. This opens the door to competition and gives rise to two risks: the first is that solidarity work may be abused and that prudential systems that have been imposed on insurers will be weakened. Mr Karas incorporated our amendment seeking to establish the principle of interactive management, but that will only have any real bearing if the institutions involved are not treated like standard financial investors throughout the directive. The prudential framework laid down by the Commission is vague and the report imposes the country of origin principle, which we find unacceptable, since the destination Member State must, of course, also retain the possibility of establishing coherence with internal social law. Lastly, prior tax harmonisation is still not included in these texts, which means we are once again opening the way to fiscal dumping.
Ladies and gentlemen, we are today faced with a key test on the way that the European Parliament perceives its responsibilities in the area of social protection."@en1
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