Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-02-14-Speech-3-040"
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"en.20010214.2.3-040"2
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"C
Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first of all like to congratulate Mr Swoboda on his report and to thank Parliament for an extremely constructive and responsible debate. I think you have sent a very positive and also a very clear and unambiguous signal to Turkey. I believe that, at the end of this debate, we can say that consensus regarding our policy towards Turkey has become much broader. We agree that the current situation regarding human rights, the protection of minorities and the quality of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey is not what we would wish for. Unfortunately, nothing has changed in that regard. There is no point glossing over this fact or remaining silent about what is actually happening. Because the situation is as it is, because it is so unsatisfactory, we have endlessly debated what political possibilities we have of changing it. This brings me to my second point.
May I say finally that, in my estimation, in the year 2000 we set something in motion in Turkey. We, as politicians, know that the start of a political movement cannot be measured initially in real changes, be it in terms of prisons, NGOs, schools or whatever. No, the start of a political movement can only be measured in the way a society talks about the issues, what issues it talks about and what long-term objectives it sets itself.
In this connection we can very clearly discern in Turkey a massive movement in the year 2000. In my opinion, the correct response for the European Union is to support such a political movement and to make the instruments available which we need to bring about tangible concrete results.
I would like to say one last thing. We will not be able to measure the success of our pre-accession strategy towards Turkey by the promises made, i.e. we will not be able to measure it in terms of the editorial content of Turkish newspapers. But we will be able to measure the success of this strategy in what changes in concrete terms for the Turkish people, whose situations under current conditions are deplorable and in need of radical change. It will be measured in real structural changes and in real changes to people’s living conditions. When we see these changes, the time will have come to talk about the next step, but not today. I am pleased to have discovered such a broad consensus regarding this matter in this Parliament. I believe that it will help us a great deal if Turkey realises that the Council, Parliament and the Commission have, on this matter, adopted a firm common stance – at least in terms of the basic issues. Our steadfastness in this matter will help us to reach our goals.
We also agree that it is not only in Turkey’s interest but in the interest of Europe as a whole, and especially in the interest of the European Union, to have Turkey as a stable and reliable partner in the long term. I am sure everyone in this House will agree with me when I say the long-term stability of a state can only be guaranteed if this state is founded on the values we all share, such as democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities. Thirdly, I think we agree that the prospect of membership of the European Union has been the central and most important catalyst for reform; at least this has been the case throughout the entire history of our enlargement process. If you look at the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the tremendous pace of reform they have embarked upon and the enormous success they have had, this has only come about because they had membership in their sights.
The question we must now answer is: can we achieve the same with Turkey? In Helsinki we said, yes, we should give it a go. We are now at a stage where the strategy adopted in Helsinki has become operational and we can therefore actually implement it. So there is little point in talking today about whether the strategy adopted in Helsinki has changed what is happening on the ground in Turkey or not. It simply has not. I would never say it has changed it, but the instruments of this strategy are just not in place. That is why one cannot say either that it has not had any results. With what is being discussed here today and what you will subsequently adopt, you are paving the way for the entry into force of the central element of this strategy, namely the accession partnership.
The Accession Partnership sets out our expectations of Turkey. It lays down what Turkey must do so that we can achieve the result that Turkey fulfils the political and other accession criteria. Once this document has been formally adopted – indeed it has not yet been adopted as we are waiting upon Parliament to express its opinion – we can expect an immediate answer from Turkey. This document will be the most important document in the history of Euro-Turkish relations over the past few decades.
What I have learned so far leads me to the belief that we are quite possibly on the brink of the most far-reaching political reform in the history of modern Turkey. That is not to say that today we can discover whether everything that Turkey says to us in its reply will be fully in line with our expectations. In this respect, Mr Swoboda is quite right when he says that the ball is now in Turkey’s court. It is really now up to Turkey what steps it takes, what rhythm it adopts and what qualitative efforts it puts into fulfilling the conditions for taking up negotiations on its membership of the European Union. That is why I underline what a number of speakers have already said.
Turkey is an important country. Turkey is of particular strategic importance. But that does not mean that, because of Turkey’s strategic importance, the European Union can change its inner character. That can and must not happen. It is only right and proper that Turkey wants to join the European Union and not the other way round and that, for that very reason, the accession conditions we have drawn up for all are equally and fully valid for Turkey. Turkey will not become a member until it has fulfilled these accession conditions to the letter. Neither I nor anybody else knows whether the strategy we adopted in Helsinki, which is fully supported by Parliament, will have the desired effects. But we have for the first time reached the stage where Turkey must present us with a binding programme and must tell us what it intends to do to change conditions in Turkey. It will give us the opportunity to bring influence to bear on this programme, because it is a jointly agreed programme, because it is jointly financed by us and because we have the opportunity to influence it and monitor it.
That is why I believe that we have made enormous strides. As far as the financial and budgetary aspect is concerned, questions have been raised, which I will be pleased to answer. Firstly, all those who say that it would be logical to channel pre-accession aid for Turkey, Malta and Cyprus through the relevant Heading 7 of the Financial Perspective are quite right, as we are clearly dealing with pre-accession aid. The Commission would like this to happen too. But I must make it clear that this would not alter in any way the amount of money that was available. It would simply mean reducing the relevant Heading 4 and increasing Heading 7, which would not be of much benefit to Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, who naturally want more money. They do not want us to change the Heading, but more money.
But we do not have more money because the programmes in the Financial Perspective which was adopted in Berlin have been established. Nor are there any budgetary reserves. A Member of this House asked this question. No, we do not have any budgetary reserves in the pre-accession instruments. They have all been paid out. Only SAPARD was paid out rather late. That was because of the regulation for this instrument, but the funds that have been planned for 2000 will be fully paid out during the course of 2001. But we do not have any budgetary reserves there. We could only satisfy the desire, which was expressed by Mr Swoboda and is shared by many of you here, to increase pre-accession aid to Turkey, Malta and Cyprus in order to make the ISPA and SAPARD instruments accessible, by making available more budgetary resources, money which the Commission, at any rate, does not have. This must be discussed with the Council. The need may well be there, but I could not, at the moment, accede to the request. I feel bound to say in all honesty that the Commission would not be able to implement such a resolution because it simply does not have the money.
Mrs Stenzel was quite right to point out that naturally there is a difference between the candidate countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. The candidate countries of Eastern and Central Europe not only have to adapt to the
they also have to transform their entire economy. That is, in fact, the political basis for the situation we have today."@en1
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